


**The Center for Naval
Warfare Studies**

Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession for the 21st Century



by
LTC Richard A. Lacquement Jr.
United States Army

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Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession for the 21st Century

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Chapter 1: Introduction & Framework

...Our nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win the nation's wars. Every other task is subordinate to that commitment. To discharge our responsibilities to the Nation, we maintain several core competencies. These are the essential and enduring capabilities of our service. They encompass the full range of military operations across the spectrum of conflict, from sustained land dominance in wartime to supporting civil authorities during natural disasters and consequence management. We organize, equip and train The Army to maintain Army core competencies—each part of the force exists to support and maintain them. We assess current readiness and manage future force development by balancing six imperatives—doctrine, organizations, material, leader development, training, and Soldiers. That balance results in an Army capable of land force dominance across the range of military operations and the spectrum of conflict, thereby fulfilling our fundamental purpose—serving the Nation.¹

FM 1: The Army, 14 June 2001

Introduction

The first priority of Army leaders is to define clearly the future of the Army profession. Changes in the international security environment and changes in technology challenge the nature and role of the Army for the future. Focused, strategic leadership of the profession will be an essential component of successful transformation. To serve American society effectively, strategic leaders of the profession must define the expert knowledge of the profession, the jurisdictions within which this knowledge applies, and then develop the professionals to apply this knowledge. In short, the nature of the professional environment has changed, therefore the Army profession must change.

Understanding the Army as a profession is a key distinction. It is more than a combination of skills, crafts or occupations. It is the application of abstract knowledge to specific human problems. Professions develop expert knowledge for application to

particular realms of social concern, and are responsible for imbedding that knowledge in individual professionals. Professions also compete with other professions in a system to clarify or claim legitimate authority for the application of their expert knowledge in jurisdictions.

The strategic leaders of the Army need to redraw the map of expert knowledge of the army profession to facilitate adaptability in response to uncertainty. The uncertainty is due primarily to the end of the cold war and the broader and less certain security challenges the United States has faced since. Fundamentally, the cold war US Army was optimized for conventional warfare against the Soviet Union in Europe. This clear priority formed the focal point of the Army's professional identity and guided the development of Army expertise. The Army's force structure, doctrine, and professional development systems are still rooted in the cold war era. Strategic leaders of the Army profession must clarify how the challenges of the post-Cold War era are different. This includes an articulation of the appropriate expertise of the Army profession in general terms and clarification of the jurisdictions within which this expertise should be applied.

The United States Army is in the midst of a major transformation effort. This effort is intended to adapt the Army to better face the challenges of an uncertain future. To do this successfully, there are many relevant aspects of the Army that its leaders must address. This study suggests recommendations to help clarify the future contours of the Army profession. It recommends a draft framework for defining professional expertise and professional jurisdictions. Clarity about these professional foundations will support a logical, prioritized analysis of the educational system and personnel management systems to best support the future 'full spectrum' force.

¹ U.S. Army, *FM 1: The Army*, 14 June 2001, 32.

Problem

The Army is at a crossroads. Its traditions, recent successes and capabilities are praiseworthy. Its appropriate focus for the future is uncertain. "Full Spectrum Dominance" is a great bumper sticker but of limited practical utility. In fact, it glosses over too much. It lacks boundaries. It lacks priorities and clarity. There have been large surveys of Army personnel and a variety of anecdotal evidence that suggest there are major rifts and tensions within the American Army officer corps—particularly between senior officers and junior officers.² There is a gap and it is undermining the trust and confidence in leaders of the profession.

We have witnessed a significant junior officer exodus from the Army, a perceived lack of trust between junior and senior officers, stifling micromanagement, and a perceived lack of reciprocal commitment from the Army to its officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers and their families commensurate with their dedication and sacrifices.³

General Shinseki has provided a vision of how he sees the Army developing its conventional forces for the next 25 years. He has also articulated the long-standing Army focus on fighting and winning the nation's wars. Nonetheless, there are still tensions within the officer corps concerning the definition of the Army's professional expertise and its application within appropriate jurisdictions. As the opening quote suggests, aside from war, everything is of equal priority.

Tensions tend to accompany major changes. In recent years, the United States Army has born this out. The Army was well focused, trained and ready to meet the

² Center for Strategic and International Studies, *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, A Report of the CSIS International Security Program. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, February 2000 and Army Training and Leader Development Panel, *Officer Study: Report to The Army*, May 2001, available at <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf>, Internet, accessed 1 November 2001.

³ Joe LeBoeuf, "Three Case Studies on the Army's Internal Jurisdictions,. Case No. 3: The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel," Chapter 22 in Snider and Watkins, *Future of the Army Profession*, 487.

challenge of its Cold War Soviet enemy.⁴ The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have created many different challenges from those anticipated during the Cold War. In some ways, the tremendous success of the Army in recovering from Vietnam and better preparing for the Soviet challenge is impeding the current transformation. Clear focus on a specific foe, in a specific theater, provided a high degree of professional certainty for the Army. The 'training revolution' of the 1970s led to a dramatic improvement of Army training particularly in relation to fighting the Soviet Union.⁵ The systems of collective and individual training were predicated on a clear overarching mission.

The current era is one of broader and less certain missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has been involved in several operational missions. The Gulf War drew most heavily and consistently on the focused training for conventional warfare with the Soviets that characterized the Cold War. This mission fit the Army's preferred concept of war and was well suited to the Army's expertise of the latter stages of the Cold War. On the other hand, numerous peace operations such as the missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo were not well suited to the training and organization of the Cold War Army. Debates over the appropriate compatibility of the US Army with peace operations has been an ongoing feature of professional concern.⁶ There has been tremendous dissonance among Army leaders between the expectation and requirements

⁴ The Soviet Union was the primary foe for which the United States Army prepared. Clearly, the United States Army was also well prepared for a similar conventional war foe in Korea.

⁵ For a description of the training revolution of the 1970s see, Rodler F. Morris, Scott W. Lackey, George J. Mordica II, and J. Patrick Hughes, *Initial Impressions Report: Changing the Army*, Combined Arms Center History Office, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1994. Available from <http://call.army.mil/products/exfor/specrpt/sprptoc.htm>, Internet, accessed 25 May 2002.

⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*. A Report of the CSIS International Security Program. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, February 2000, Executive Summary, xxii-xxiii.

related to being prepared to 'fight and win our nations wars,' and the numerous operational requirements for military operations other than war (MOOTW). This reflects an internal tension concerning appropriate Army professional jurisdictions for the application of Army professional expertise. This should not be allowed to continue.

Intellectual Framework

The Army needs to redraw the map of its expert knowledge and then inform and reform its educational and developmental systems accordingly, resolving any debate over the appropriate expertise of America's Army.⁷

The Army faces increasing jurisdictional competitions with new competitors. Thus its jurisdictional boundaries must be constantly negotiated and clarified by officers comfortable at the bargaining table and skilled in dealing with professional colleagues on matters touching the profession's civil-military and political-military boundaries.⁸

This study builds on two concepts. The first is the concept of the military profession provided in Samuel Huntington's classic, *The Soldier and the State*.⁹ Second is the concept of professional adaptation and adjustment suggested by Andrew Abbott in *The System of Professions*.¹⁰ Huntington provides a commonly understood definition of the military profession. With some adjustments and refinement, this study suggests an appropriate definition of the Army profession. Abbott provides a framework for understanding how professions adapt and sustain themselves by competing, negotiating and defining their roles with their clients and among the members of the profession. This study draws on Abbott's framework to suggest a map of Army expert knowledge and the appropriate jurisdictions for this expertise.

⁷ Snider and Watkins, 538.

⁸ Ibid, 543.

⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

¹⁰ Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Huntington's definition of a profession is "a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics."¹¹ It is defined by expertise, responsibility and corporateness.¹² With regard to the military profession, "The direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer."¹³ The responsibility of a profession is to its client. "The military profession is monopolized by the state. The skill of the officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society."¹⁴ But members of the military are apart from society too. Sir General John Hackett makes this point well in a series of superb lectures on the profession of arms delivered in 1962.

The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability, which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian.¹⁵

The Army professional core is found among its officers. They are required to master a body of abstract professional knowledge that extends well beyond the expert application of particular skills to the understanding of the moral, ethical, political, and social contexts within which military actions take place. They must be experts first and foremost of the human dimensions of their role—in leadership, morale, and physical capacity—that underlie effective military operations. This is significantly different than the expectation of warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and junior enlisted soldiers. In Huntington's formulation, the difference between officers and other

¹¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 7.

¹² *Ibid.*, 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

¹⁵ Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, 63.

members of the force is that officers must be experts in the management of violence whereas other members of the organization (warrant officers, NCOs, junior enlist soldier) must be expert in the application of violent means.¹⁶

Huntington also suggested that the most appropriate means to effective military subordination by civilians was to "militarize the military" and maintain a clear divide between the realms of civilian and military responsibility.¹⁷ One of the common critiques of Huntington is that the degree of clarity about this separation is easy to posit in theory but exceptionally hard to operationalize in practice. As Clausewitz's insight suggests, since war is merely an instrument of policy, it is difficult to separate the purely military from the purely political or policy related.¹⁸ Nevertheless, it is important to make distinctions between areas of appropriate military expertise and realms of pure conjecture or simple opinion. To validate the importance of military advice, there should be standards to help determine appropriate boundaries. Issues of politics and military-technical expertise can be identified as belonging to separate realms, however, there are areas where the issues closely intersect and overlap. This study suggests useful Army professional standards that can assist in making these distinctions.

Refined to reflect this quintessentially human endeavor, the core expertise of American officers can be restated as follows. The peculiar skill of the military officer is the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization, a profession, whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people; for the Army officer such development, operation and leadership occurs incident to sustaining America's dominance in land warfare. In abbreviated form, I will refer to this

¹⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 83.

core expertise as 'Leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force.'¹⁹

Andrew Abbott provides insight into a key property of professions. As his starting point, he takes a looser definition than most about the trappings of professions. Abbott defines professions as "...somewhat exclusive groups of individuals applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases."²⁰ Professions compete with each other to determine legitimate realms within which to apply their expertise.²¹ Professions provide social goods to address important problems. "The tasks of professions are human problems amenable to expert service."²² Furthermore, "The central phenomenon of professional life is thus the link between a profession and its work, a link I shall call jurisdiction."²³ Professions compete for jurisdictions and may not always be able to claim full and complete control over all jurisdictions within which they compete. "Every profession aims for a heartland of work over which it has complete, legally established control." However, since full control is not always possible, there are other possible settlements. Most prominent for this study, in addition to full jurisdictions are divided (shared with another profession), intellectual (cognitive control of a jurisdiction while allowing practical work to be widely shared), advisory (over certain aspects of work within a jurisdiction) or subordinate (another profession controls the jurisdiction but the first profession may still do practical work within the jurisdiction).²⁴

¹⁸ Clausewitz >>>>>>>>

¹⁹ I acknowledge the help of Don Snider in crafting this wording for the nature of the Army profession's core expertise. E-mail communication with the author 29 May 2002.

²⁰ Abbott, *The System of Professions*, 318.

²¹ Ibid, 33.

²² Ibid, 35.

²³ Ibid, 20.

²⁴ Ibid, 69-71.

Drawing on Abbott's framework, the fundamental questions that army leaders must address in defining the Army profession are the following:

- *What is the nature of army expert knowledge? How should relevant expertise be prioritized?*
- *What are the jurisdictions within which this expertise may be legitimately applied? How should jurisdictions be prioritized? Which should be claimed and defended? Which jurisdictions are less significant or appropriate?*
- *How should the Army develop professionals to master this expertise?*

These are iterative questions that the leaders of the profession must constantly address.

Army leaders must understand the context and contingency of their answers as influencing factors change (such as the international environment, domestic political environment, technology, etc.). A major contingent element is the time frame. The questions can help yield descriptive answers for the present and suggestive answers for the future. Strategic leaders of the Army profession must be prepared to revise and renegotiate the answers with the civilian leaders who act as agents on behalf of American society. Hence, this is fundamentally an aspect of civil-military relations. The answers are the heart of the social contract with the profession's client—American society. To minimize drift and confusion, they must be answered as clearly as possible. Strategic leaders of the profession must therefore have a vision for the profession and must negotiate with the leaders of society to establish the legitimacy of that vision and the jurisdictions to which it applies. Army leaders can then focus on developing the professionals responsible for realizing the vision. Given the long lead times required to develop individual professionals, the questions of appropriate expertise and jurisdictions must also be answered prospectively. That is, what is the appropriate expertise for 2010? 2020? What are the appropriate jurisdictions?

Ultimately, civilian leaders decide the jurisdictions for the Army. But, Army strategic leaders must represent the profession in this decision-making process. Within the framework of this study, civilian leaders' decisions become part of the iterative process that may then require strategic leaders of the profession to re-evaluate and modify conceptions of professional expert knowledge and professional jurisdictions.

In a recent edited volume, several authors explored aspects of the challenges to the Army profession.²⁵ Led by project directors Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, this study of the future of the Army profession identified several problems. One of the most important problems is the lack of clear strategic leadership of the profession.

The Army's unique characteristics make leadership of the profession, particularly at the strategic level, different from leading another type of organization or bureaucracy.²⁶

Although there are many examples of Army efforts to change organizations, structures, schools, doctrine, equipment, etc, there is no fundamental exploration of the professional framework from which all of these other changes should derive.

In Army doctrine, Strategic leadership of the Army refers to,

The Army's highest-level thinkers, warfighters, and political military experts. Some work in an institutional setting within the United States; others work in strategic regions around the world. They simultaneously sustain the Army's culture, envision the future, convey that vision to a wide audience, and personally lead change. Strategic leaders look at the environment outside the Army today to understand the context for the institution's future role. They also use their knowledge of the current force to anchor their vision in reality.²⁷

²⁵ Don. M. Snider, and Gayle Watkins, eds. *The Future of the Army Profession*. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2002.

²⁶ Don. M. Snider, and Gayle Watkins, "The Future of the Army Profession." *Assembly* (November/December 2001), 48.

²⁷ Department of the Army, *FM 100-22 Leadership*, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1999, p. 7-1.

Analyzing the role of strategic leadership in light of Abbott's analysis, there are additional considerations that apply to strategic leadership of a profession.

The Army's strategic leaders must perform the traditional roles of generating a strategic vision and then leading the implementation conceived to fulfill that vision. With regard to the institution's vision, the strategic leader must provide purpose, direction, energy, motivation, inspiration, and a clear professional identity. While these elements are consistent with the traditional approach of Huntington and Janowitz, when viewed in the context of Abbott's model there are new elements to be included in the vision—the profession's expert knowledge, legitimacy, and jurisdictional competitions that ultimately determine its future.²⁸

Building on the efforts of Snider, Watkins, et al, the focus of this study is the preliminary creation of a map of expert knowledge for the Army profession and the identification and clarification of appropriate jurisdictions for the application of this expertise by members of the profession.²⁹ It provides a framework for suggesting what expertise defines the Army profession, how this expertise is bounded and how it should be prioritized. Closely related to the first step is the identification and prioritization of jurisdictions within which the expertise applies. The primary utility of this study is the framework. I have tried to make it logical and coherent. Its applicability and implications are just one view, my own, of how it should apply. The identification of appropriate professional expertise and jurisdictions provides the rationale for systems to develop individual professionals. Although I have suggested some elements of a model to develop individual professionals, I have not provided a comprehensive one.

As Huntington suggested, strategic leaders need a clear understanding of the nature of the army's expertise and the appropriate jurisdictions within which it can be

²⁸ Gregg F. Martin and Jeffrey D. McCausland, "The Role of Strategic Leaders for the Future Army Profession," in Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 429.

²⁹ Abbott suggests the idea of a professional map with regard to professional colligation and classification. These two are intertwined as the manner of colligation is often influenced by the classification scheme. "A

usefully applied. They should be able to make these arguments on the firmest possible professional grounds, that is, with regard to what Clausewitz called "the grammar of war."³⁰ Recognizing that domestic politics and foreign policy are beyond the military's professional expertise is an important limiting factor.

Suzanne Neilson makes an excellent point that the Weinberger rules may be useful to politicians thinking about the use of force, but all except two of the rules (concerning the expected costs of military operations and the reevaluation of costs throughout a mission.) pose problems for military leaders.

Military leaders who adopt all of Weinberger's tests are taking positions that stretch proper conceptions of military professionalism—actions that could have implications for the military profession itself.³¹

The reason such clarity matters is that military advice not derived from military expertise compromises the legitimacy of military advice in other contexts (the leader could be perceived as just another political actor espousing a political opinion).

Positions based on either an overly narrow or an overly broad conception of the military's professional expertise could ultimately have negative consequences. The input of military officers could come to be seen either as irrelevant to the needs of the policy-maker, or as having dubious professional credibility.... This also suggests that establishing a solid understanding within the profession of what that professional expertise includes would be of value.³²

It is one thing to lay out the capabilities and limitations of military forces with regard to particular objectives, it is an entirely different (and inappropriate) thing to become involved in judging the validity of the policy goal itself (which properly belongs in the realm of public policy and political debate).

classification system is a profession's own mapping of its jurisdiction, an internal dictionary embodying the professional dimensions of classification." Abbott, *System of Professions*, 41.

³⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 605.

³¹ Suzanne C. Nielson, "Rules of the Game? The Weinberger Doctrine and the American Use of Force, Chapter 10 in Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 218

Defining the map of the Army's professional expertise is important to ensuring the relevance and validity of Army's leaders in representing the appropriate roles and missions of the Army. Strategic leaders imperil the Army institution as a whole if they lose sight of the professional foundations of their role and allow themselves to be drawn into policy and other debates that exceed their professional expertise and professional experience.

It is also a fine line between Clausewitz's wise counsels for officers to be aware of policy and the demands of state (sensitive to the context within which they operate) and actually stepping in to try to determine appropriate policy goals, which are rightfully the purview of government alone. The framework presented here can help draw that line more clearly.

What This Study Tries to Do

I hope to provide a useful framework to Army strategic leaders to support the transformation of the Army profession as part of the broader effort to transform the Army. This framework is composed of a map of expert knowledge of the profession connected to an understanding of appropriate professional jurisdictions. The detailed application and implications of this framework yield the guidelines for the human development system that will imbed expert knowledge in professionals.

I start by using the abbreviated framework to briefly assess how the Army arrived at its current position. This brief and general historical survey is presented in Chapter 2. This includes an historical overview of the development of the Army profession since the end of the Civil War. This history is relevant because it highlights the trajectory of the Army profession and helps illuminate aspects of the Army profession that frame the

³² Neilson, 219.

current era. The Army of the future cannot be developed from a blank sheet of paper. It will be grown from the current Army, which has been built on the past.

Next, I analyze key external factors that shape the context within which the Army profession must operate. The nature of important contextual elements external to the Army suggest some key principles that must guide the Army's transformation while sustaining effective responsibility for the missions required by society. The external context of professional change is conditioned most heavily by the technological challenges of the information-driven revolution in military affairs, the uncertain international security environment and the competition within a system of professions. Explaining this external context is the focus of Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 provides an overview and analysis of the ongoing efforts for Army revitalization and transformation. There are many efforts of relevance to the Army as a profession that have been undertaken in the years since the end of the Cold War. Many are still in progress. These efforts have been very beneficial already and hold great promise for the successful transformation of the Army in accordance with the Chief of Staff's vision. The Army is working hard to reform itself to support the overall transformation vision that General Shinseki articulated. But, it also appears evident that there is a great deal of organizational and conceptual inertia that has inhibited coherent implementation of the profession's transformation. It is easier to provide the rhetoric and logic of transformation. It is not so easy to make it happen. This study assesses recent efforts in light of their contribution to the future of the Army profession.

Recognizing the uncertainty that has disrupted the Army's professional focus, Chapter 5 embarks on the most ambitious and potentially controversial portion of this

study. In Chapter 5 I provide a suggested map of the Army's expert knowledge. The point of departure is the Army's statutory responsibility to society. This map is part prescriptive and part descriptive and consists of two main pieces. The first is an institutional perspective of the profession's expert knowledge with analysis and categorization of the subsets of knowledge the profession requires. This map of the Army profession's expertise establishes a way of thinking about the characteristics of expert knowledge as they relate to the core of the Army's expertise. Thinking of expertise in terms of core, core support, liaison, and borrowed relationships suggests priorities of these elements to the Army as a profession. The second piece is a suggested map of the Army professionals' expertise. This map suggests a way to think about the nature of individual professional expertise. It provides preliminary principles of the profession's development of both generalists and specialists to acquire expertise on behalf of the profession. This second piece describes how the current officer specialties relate to the profession's required expertise. It accepts the current branch and functional area structure of the Army as the point of departure and draws out the connection between the areas of expertise and the manner in which such expertise currently is acquired by the profession. This chapter concludes with my view (one of hopefully many) of practical applications and implications. In particular, it provides suggestions for restructuring the officer corps to focus more clearly on its priority professional expert knowledge.

Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the jurisdictions within which the Army's professional expertise applies. This chapter is also part descriptive and prescriptive. The Army has a variety of professional jurisdictions within which it can operate.

The Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win our Nation's wars. Our unique contribution to national security is prompt, sustained land dominance across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict. The Army provides the land force dominance essential to shaping the international security environment.³³

As with its core jurisdiction of land warfare, the Army operates in other jurisdictions ultimately legitimized by the demands of society, represented by its civilian leaders. In a passive formulation, the Army is simply a loyal servant of society and does what it is asked to do. Superficially accurate and normatively supportable, this formulation overlooks an important responsibility for the profession to participate in clarifying appropriate jurisdictions in negotiation with its societal client. The Army's professional expertise and capabilities are not infinitely fungible. The Army has limited capacity. The fact that this capacity may also be useful in other contexts ignores normative consideration of opportunity costs. The Army is capable of performing duties unrelated to its core expertise and core mission. The costs of doing so must be measured against its ability to effectively perform duties for which it is uniquely designed and for which society is solely reliant upon the Army. The Army's jurisdictions therefore represent the outcome of a critical process of negotiation and refinement. The negotiation is between the strategic leaders of the Army profession and the civilian leaders of society. Army leaders must be able to reconcile the jurisdictions within which the profession operates with the expertise and capacity it possesses. The Army should seek to defend and sustain clear control over missions for which it possesses full and complete jurisdiction. Conversely, Army leaders must provide unambiguous advice concerning the relevant relationship between the Army's professional expertise and its applicability to other jurisdictions. Civilian leaders have the final decision in directing the Army to accept

³³ Department of the Army, *FM 1: The Army*, 14 June 2001, 21.

responsibilities in a variety of jurisdictions. Army leaders cannot reject such decisions and must ultimately be ready to accept them. Army leaders should nonetheless be clear about the nature of the Army's appropriate role within these jurisdictions. Army leaders should understand and articulate concepts full or divided, subordinate, and advisory jurisdictions to clarify appropriate application of Army professional expertise and capacity. Lastly, it is important to recognize that the identification of legitimate professional jurisdictions has a dynamic relationship with the development of professional expertise. Expertise is developed for application within particular jurisdictions. If jurisdictions are no longer applicable to the clients needs or the client requires participation in other jurisdictions, the appropriate expertise of the profession may be affected. If the expertise to address problems in a jurisdiction can be found in other professions, competition may eliminate the need for a profession's particular body of abstract knowledge and hence, lead to the death of the profession. This chapter also concludes with my view (again, one of potentially many) of practical applications and implications.

Chapter 7 provides a summary of the study. It summarizes general policy guidelines provided in the previous chapters. This includes an effort to draw out and articulate broad guiding principles that can assist strategic leaders of the army profession to move the profession forward. This chapter also identifies some likely obstacles to change that will confront strategic leaders of the profession. The chapter also identifies some useful avenues for further study and provides a brief conclusion.

What This Study Does Not Do

I have approached this topic with a very short time line and a clear understanding that there is no way that I could reasonably judge every Army task and every Army occupational specialty to suggest which belong in or out of the Army profession. To limit the scope of this study, I have confined myself to focus on areas of abstract professional knowledge and how these areas define the Army's professional expertise. I do not attempt to define every competency and every task that should be expected from each specialty or branch. Such detailed study of each branch or functional area is a logical extension of my efforts that warrants further study by individuals or groups better versed in the nuances of those specialties.

This study is also explicitly focused on the profession as defined by the commissioned officer corps. This is not meant to slight warrant officers, non-commissioned officers or junior enlisted soldiers. These highly skilled workers are the experts in the innumerable necessary tasks that allow the Army to succeed. But the realm of their responsibilities is fundamentally different from the demands of the Army's commissioned leaders. These soldiers and their tremendous skills are the instruments of Army success. The diagnoses, inferences and treatments of societal problems for which these skills are appropriately applied are the responsibilities of the commissioned officers who are guardians and caretakers of the profession's essence. Although this study certainly contains broad implications for these other members of the organization, it does not provide detailed analysis or recommendations for their transformation.

Lastly, a word about applicability; I believe this study provides a framework applicable to all components of the Total Army (active forces, Reserves and National

Guard). The principles and logic do not change. I acknowledge that with respect to the National Guard, the dynamic of jurisdictional definition and negotiation is complicated by the dual allegiance of the Guard to both National and State leaders. Nonetheless, with minor exceptions, the normative objectives of Army officers should be the same. The negotiation, however, may be more nuanced.

Summary

The central product of the study is a map of the Army profession and its relation to appropriate jurisdictions. A map is a particularly apt analogy for the nature of this effort. There are many dimensions of the issue that are difficult to portray on paper. Trying to figure out ways to portray elements of the profession in diagram, table or other short hand is difficult. It is difficult to capture on a two-dimensional map all the complexity of geography and physical reality of a particular location. Furthermore, the larger the scale of the map, the more impressionistic and less detailed it becomes. Similarly, just as using a map effectively requires inference and a feel for terrain, this study relies to some degree on the feel for professional practice of individuals that is somewhat impressionistic and limited in detail. In presenting my preliminary effort to make such a map, I have used some taxonomies and classifications that are well established and some that are new. I do not pretend to have figured out the easiest or best way to portray the many elements of professional expertise and jurisdiction that situate the army within the system of professions. I present what I have created for the use, first and foremost, of the Army's strategic leaders. Second, I offer it as a broader framework for a debate among all members of the profession. I am fully aware that it this is a broad undertaking that has caused me to explore areas of expertise well beyond my own. By

this preliminary effort, I hope to induce others to critique, expound and improve upon it through the application of their expertise and insights. Most importantly, I seek to begin an institutional dialogue that can lead to a renewed consensus of the Army's professional essence.

Chapter 2: Background--The Army Profession 1865 to Present³⁴

This is not the first time that the U.S. Army has faced uncertainty and challenges to its professional identity. Discontinuities in technology, the international environment, and national policy have forced the Army to adapt to different challenges at numerous points throughout its history. The record of first battles is generally a negative one that suggests that the Army did poorly in peacetime to prepare for the challenges that arose in the next war. In the past, the problems exposed in first battles were usually alleviated by adaptations in the subsequent battles and campaigns of protracted armed struggles.³⁵ The speeds with which events can unfold in the current era suggest that there will be little time for adaptation or change once a war or crisis begins. This places greater demands on the forces in being to anticipate requirements and prepare properly.

In the sections that follow, I will use concepts of professional identity to explore how Army leaders understood and sought to influence the nature of the profession. In each section, I will start by briefly sketching some of the salient features of the international and domestic political environment that provided the context within which Army leaders defined the profession. I will then explore how Army leaders answered the questions presented in Chapter 1 (explicitly or implicitly) concerning definitions of expert knowledge, the definition and negotiation of legitimate jurisdictions, and efforts undertaken to train and educate professionals to apply professional expertise. From this

³⁴ I am indebted to Professor Tom Grassey for his assistance on this chapter as part of a directed research elective during the Winter trimester, AY 2001-2002. Although this chapter has been updated and edited significantly, the core of the argument and research were part of the directed research elective.

³⁵ See Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., *America's First Battles 1776-1965*, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986. An exception to this successful adaptation was the Army's performance in Vietnam where successful battlefield actions were not integrated into an effective overall effort to win the war. There are multiple reasons for the overall US failure, but, the inability of the Army to adapt to the

process of clarification and indoctrination springs the organizational culture that promulgates long-term professional standards. A short outline of this historical approach for each era is as follows:

- External context (relative to the profession)
 - International environment
 - Domestic environment
- Defining Army expertise
- Army professional jurisdictions
 - War
 - Military Operations Other Than War
- Developing Professionals
 - Schools and professional development

1865-1898: The Seeds of Professionalism

The seeds of a new concept of Army professionalism were sewn in the wake of the American Civil War. Prior to the Civil War, Army leadership was generally regarded as something that any well-bred gentleman should be able to do. The Civil War, however, exposed the inadequacy of that approach.

The years between 1860 and World War I saw the emergence of a distinctive American professional military ethic, with the American officer regarding himself as a member no longer of a fighting profession only, to which anybody might belong, but as a member of a learned profession whose students are students for life. With the view went the acceptance of the inevitability of conflict, arising out of the unchanging nature of man, and the consequent certainty of war.³⁶

In the wake of the Civil War, the Army was responsible for the occupation of the defeated southern states as well as resuming its frontier role fighting Native American Indians as white settlers spread across the continent. Within society as a whole, and particularly within the federal government, the traditional fears of a large standing

nature of the war is one of the contributing factors. See Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

³⁶ General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, London: The Times Publishing Company Limited, 1962, 38.

(regular) army and anti-militarism placed the regular army in isolation from society.

Though distant from society, this was a time of great internal reflection and reform within the Army. During this time, due primarily to the efforts of General William T. Sherman and General Emory Upton, the Army was able to define a view of the profession with little outside interference—but also with little outside support. Their professional vision of the Army appears to have defined the trajectory of army professional jurisdiction and development through World War I.

This professional flame was nurtured in an otherwise 'dark age' for the Army characterized by general neglect and unconcern from the government and the American population at large. Dispersed in small numbers throughout the country, but mainly the west, there was little standard education for soldiers or officers beyond West Point. With foreign threats to the United States minimal and with the country focused on westward expansion, there was little impetus for sustaining a professional military force.

Two forces worked against the regular army. First, there was little support for the Army's role in reconstruction. The Army was caught between Radical Republicans trying to use the Army to support its political control of the South and the resurgent Southern Democrats working relentlessly to undo the results of the Civil War by reestablishing the authority of white, often former Confederate leaders and to reasserting domination over the black population. Second, a large portion of the regular army was widely dispersed throughout the western states where it engaged in the long-held mission of fighting the Indians.

The Army was generally unsuccessful and unwelcome as an occupying power. It was generally successful in keeping the Indians in check. In line with isolationist

approaches to foreign policy, there was little incentive for national leaders to increase the size of the Army or to focus on training the Army for the tasks of great power military competition.

Within the Army, the general disdain of militia officers by regular officers as well as the dramatic example of martial prowess by Prussia in the 1870/71 Franco-Prussian War provided strong impetus for professionalization. Emory Upton was one of the foremost advocates of greater professionalism of the American army. With his deep familiarity of army tactics and training from the American Civil War, Upton worked hard in the years following the Civil War to address issues of professionalism and consistency that made the integration of regular and militia forces so difficult during the Civil War. During his grand tour of foreign countries from 1875-76, Upton crystallized a set of proposed reforms to improve the professionalism of the U.S. military. In particular, his reforms, like those of many other countries, focused on the Prussian model.

Like his fellow non-German officers, Upton regarded the Prussian system, with its general staff, mass army, and freedom from civilian control, an ideal one. For the remainder of his life, Upton was to attempt to get the United States Congress to adopt army reforms based on the Prussian model.³⁷

General Sherman sponsored Upton and was in accord with his concerns about the professionalism of the Army. Like Upton, Sherman envisioned a professional army focused on the warfighting model of the Europeans. Sherman clearly sought to keep the Army focused on the missions of conventional war closely associated with the major battles of the Civil War and the battles among nations in Europe. The occupation duties

³⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 96. Chapter VI in Ambrose's book, "Redefining the Army's Role," contains a good summary of the development of the Prussian military system and the international attempts to emulate Prussian success following the wars of German reunification, 1864-1871. The Prussian model gained the most for its reputation through the stunningly rapid defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

of reconstruction and the Indian fighting tasks on the frontier were distasteful to Sherman and many other regular officers. Also distasteful and unwelcome was the use of the regular army in strikebreaking duties in the last quarter of the century.³⁸

Army leaders were willing to acknowledge the necessity of performing frontier constabulary tasks and to participate as directed in quelling domestic unrest represented by widespread labor strikes. Nonetheless, they continued to define their profession in terms of major conventional warfare against other national military forces.

Among Upton's proposals following his tour of Europe were calls for expanded military education and a more rationalized command and control structure for the Army. In response, Sherman created the Infantry and Cavalry school at Fort Leavenworth—the precursor of the present day Command and General Staff College.³⁹ The post-Civil War era also witnessed the creation of other branch schools and the greater emphasis on liberal arts and humanities at West Point.⁴⁰ Less successful were the efforts to change the structure of the Army to better support centralized direction through the creation of a general staff. Such proposals, crafted and introduced in Congress, were defeated in the 1870s.⁴¹

The Spanish-American War provided the test of effectiveness for the Army Sherman and Upton tried to create. The army's poor performance in this test of arms

³⁸ For a brief account of the Army's more thankless and difficult tasks between the Civil War and Spanish-American War, see Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, Revised and Expanded edition, New York: The Free Press, 1994, 252-264.

³⁹ Although ostensibly a branch school, the curriculum included extensive focus on the art of war more generally. The school was also the model for the effort of Stephen Luce to create the Naval War College in 1884.

⁴⁰ West Point was officially removed from the domain of the Corps of Engineers in 1866. Until then, the explicit focus of West Point had been the development of specialized engineering skills. Until after the civil war, leaders in wartime were drawn from several segments of society. Several well known politicians became Colonels or Generals at the beginning of the war and held important commands throughout the war.

⁴¹ Ambrose, *Upton and the Army*, 114-119.

prompted renewed attention for Upton's farsighted analysis and a more vigorous effort to improve the professional character of the Army.

1898-1916: Refining the Professional Army

In the years immediately preceding the Spanish American War, an important influencing factor was the growing American interest in the outside world. With the final conquest and control of the continental United States (the realization of national 'manifest destiny'), there was increased interest in empire as the rightful trappings of a modern great power.

Tensions with Spain presented an opportunity for many who wanted to expand American power and prestige in the world. The United States had a long-standing proprietary interest in the security affairs of the western hemisphere (the most prominent expression of this was the Monroe Doctrine). Concerned about Spanish brutality towards Cubans, the American public was further whipped up to a frenzy over the sinking of the Battleship Maine.⁴² The Spanish-American war that followed was the United States' first major overseas conflict. Although successful, the Army performed unimpressively against the weak Spanish forces in Cuba and against insurgents in the Philippines.⁴³ In particular, the Army failed to adequately manage the logistical demands of modern warfare.⁴⁴

By 1895, the Indian conflicts were over and the frontier was secured. The Army had completed the mission that had provided the dominant justification for its existence. With the continent secure and no direct threats to the United States from any foreign

⁴² Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 799-805.

⁴³ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 297.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 303.

nations, there was little utility for maintaining a sizable regular army. The regular army remained small. But the focus of the Army was on preparation for war with other national military forces. The Prussian education model was the inspiration for the U.S. military education system.

When war was declared against Spain, the United States conducted its traditional mobilization of citizen militia to expand the Army. Unprepared for the logistical and medical demands of this large force, the Army took a long time to get the force organized. In action, the force was slow and inefficient. The practical need for the modern military force Upton and Sherman advocated was clearly demonstrated. It became politically possible to pursue organizational changes that had been tabled in the 1870s. The proposed structure more closely mirrored the Prussian model. The strategic interests of the American government now more closely aligned with the professional military aspirations instilled in the officer corps by Sherman, Upton and their successors. Leaders of the regular army and militia (renamed the National Guard) concentrated on efforts to create a total army force that could be deployed overseas against the professional armies of other great powers.

In the wake of the Spanish-American war and the appalling performance of the War Department, the Secretary of War, Russell Alger, lost his position and was replaced by Elihu Root. Shortly after becoming secretary, Root was exposed to Upton's efforts and became an avid advocate of the reforms Upton had suggested.⁴⁵ Among the reforms

⁴⁵ Ambrose, *Upton and the Army*, 155. At his death in 1881, Upton left an unfinished manuscript entitled *The Military Policy of the United States*. Almost complete, several drafts had been circulated to close friends and colleagues of comment, to include the General in Chief, General Sherman. The general outlines of his arguments were well known and circulated among Army officers. When Root became Secretary of War, he heard about the unpublished manuscript and was able to find a copy. With some minor editing under his direction, Upton's manuscript was finally published by the War Department in 1904.

Root implemented, based on Upton's works, was the creation of an army general staff led by the Chief of Staff who in turn reported directly to the Secretary of War. He also eliminated the bureaucratic problem of separate bureaus within the Army and eliminated the position of Commanding General as the highest army billet. To improve the Army's ability to handle the greater complexities this large force demanded, Elihu Root also created the Army War College.⁴⁶ Initially, the Army War College was an adjunct of the general staff that studied current problems and conducted war planning. Root was also instrumental in the revitalization of the Army's Infantry and Cavalry school at Fort Leavenworth. The School at Leavenworth was re-designated the General Service and Staff School and reoriented toward the integration of officers from all combat arms in more general education of army staff responsibilities at the tactical and operational levels of war.⁴⁷ The school at Leavenworth thus repositioned itself to be in the middle of a three tiered army educational system that started with the basic branch (tactical) schools and was capped by the Army War College and its emphasis on the strategic level of war.

Unlike other professions (including the Navy's officers), Army officers did not claim that generalship was a "scientific" matter that could be reduced to predictable formulas for human behavior. At the risk of being called romantic irrationals and of accepting "inspired" amateurs to their ranks like Theodore Roosevelt, Army officers insisted that their fundamental expertise was in the moral inspiration of fighting men. The professional officer was most capable of understanding and integrating both the rational irrational characteristics of combat leadership. An army trained and organized by such officers would be the most efficient in war. The professionals recognized the value of the "scientific management" movement in business and other organizations; they recognized that technology would change the weapons of war; they appreciated the value of European military practices. But they insisted that the social environment of America and the unpredictable nature of war demanded

⁴⁶ James, E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration 1900-1963*.

Washington D.C.: Center of Military History of the United States Army, 1975, 6-12.

⁴⁷ Boyd L. Dastrup, *The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History*, Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1982, 43.

that the professional officer be hero, gentleman, student of human psychology, and manager. He could not, however, learn or balance this set of occupational roles without long experience and formal education. This was the professionals' argument, and by 1918 they had won it with the American people.⁴⁸

The effectiveness of these improvements was generally born out in the Army's success during World War I. However, the expansion of the Army in World War I placed a major strain on the Army's existing structure. Furthermore, the Army's equipment was inadequate for the demands of modern war. The Americans, therefore, relied heavily on their European allies to provide many of the necessary weapons for the war.⁴⁹ This illustrated continued Army shortcomings that would be remedied following the war.

1918-1938: Industrial RMA and Mobilization

In the era immediately following World War I, the Army faced numerous challenges in transformation and adaptation. First, the World War in Europe illustrated changes in modern warfare that required the Army to reevaluate its role. Upon entry into the war, the Army had little modern equipment and was forced to rely on allies.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the nature of the war in Europe lent further credence to the analysis of Emory Upton concerning the professionalization of the armed forces. Completing many of the reforms that Upton had advocated over three decades before, the National Defense Act of 1916 created a system to better integrate the regular, reserve and militia (now National Guard) forces.⁵¹ The 1920 National Defense Act further clarified the new organizational structure and established an emphasis on the active army as the force

⁴⁸ Allan R. Millett, "Military Professionalism and Officership in America." In Christopher C. Starling and William O. Jackson. eds. *West Point's Perspectives on Officership. Selected Reading*. Cincinnati: Thomas Learning Custom Publishing, 2001, 144.

⁴⁹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 354.

⁵⁰ The French and the British provided most of the US Army's WWI artillery and aircraft.

around which the citizen army (National Guard and reserves) would mobilize in time of war. To maintain this expansible army structure, active units were top heavy in officers and senior enlisted soldiers. These leaders provided the cadre around which National Guard and reserve units formed.⁵²

The Army was clearly focused on great power, conventional war as its primary professional task. However, the interwar army was required to devote significant time and effort to missions other than war. Briefly following World War I, a portion of the Army remained in Europe to conduct occupation duties in Germany. During the depression, the Army was given responsibility for organizing and supervising the vast labor efforts of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).⁵³ These missions were clearly regarded by Army leaders as a distraction from the primary warfighting missions. Some officers, however, embraced the positive benefit of such missions in maintaining army force structure.⁵⁴

This increased emphasis on a credible, expansible army for war against other great powers led to support for a stronger army general staff to handle complex planning and preparation for possible wars. The more robust general staff also allowed the War College to focus on more purely educational efforts.⁵⁵

Carrying on the professional momentum of the pre-World War I force, the Army emphasized leader development and education. During the interwar years, the Army

⁵¹ Ambrose, *Upton and The Army*, 156-159.

⁵² The Army after World War I maintained three times as many officers as it had before World War I even though the overall size of the Army had increased by only a third. Michael Meese, *Defense Decision Making Under Budget Stringency: Explaining Downsizing in the United States Army*. Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2000, 85.

⁵³ Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People*, 955.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 84.

accomplished a major expansion of its professional education program. The number of officers that attended the Military Academy, the Staff College at Leavenworth and the Army War College all increased dramatically.⁵⁶ Army leaders also placed significant time, effort, and limited budget resources into improving the quality of the schools. In both quality and quantity, the professional education of army officers improved markedly.⁵⁷

Following World War I, the Army found little in its fundamental doctrine that it deemed important to change. Entering during the latter stages of the conflict, the U.S. Army was able to conduct open maneuver warfare in many of its battles and was spared much of the stalemate of trench warfare that had defined the experience of the other armies on the Western Front. This bred a certain arrogance that allowed army leaders to dismiss the experience of other forces and to instead attribute their failings to national character faults that Americans supposedly did not possess. The primary issue of concern was scale, not substance. The massive expansion of the force and its deployment to Europe had presented a new challenge. The focus was on improving efforts to mobilize the necessary forces and industrial production to execute existing doctrine.⁵⁸

Preparation for possible war against other great power military forces was the focal point of army efforts following World War I. Regular army officers argued for a larger standing to force to meet the threat of great power conflict. Nonetheless, the Army accepted society's requirement to concentrate on supporting the mobilization of the

⁵⁵ Carl, J. Cartwright, "The Education and Development of the Strategic Leader from 1919-1940: Is there Relevance Today?" *USAWC Strategy Research Project*. Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 10 April 2000, 4-5, 8.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 10.

⁵⁷ Meese, *Defense Decision Making Under Budget Stringency*, 95-99

⁵⁸ William Odom, *After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999.

citizen army. The most important role of active army units was working with the National Guard and with programs such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). These programs provided a framework for army expansion that relied on citizen-soldiers to provide the bulk of the Army's warfighting capabilities. This emphasis on training the National Guard and other citizen soldiers left little room for regular forces to conduct large unit training and therefore test new concepts and doctrine. Not until World War II began in Europe did army units begin large-scale training exercises to test and evaluate new battle concepts.⁵⁹

In World War II, this expansible army concept achieved its greatest success. Upton's model of army organization was almost completely realized and vindicated. A vast citizen force coalesced around the core of professionals who were well trained and educated on the challenges of war. Additionally, the understanding and management of industrial mobilization generated material capacity of unprecedented scale. It was also very helpful that the United States had several months to mobilize for combat while British, Soviet and Chinese allies bore the brunt of land combat.⁶⁰

1945-1960: Cold War, Korean War and Nuclear RMA

The decade following World War II was a particularly challenging one for the United States Army. As with the aftermath of other major wars, the first demand upon the Army was for rapid demobilization. From over eight million soldiers in 1945, the

⁵⁹ The United States Army conducted its first large scale maneuvers, the Louisiana Maneuvers, in 1940. The war in Europe has already begun although the United States was not yet a belligerent. For a description, see Sullivan, Gordon R. (Chief of Staff, Army), and Togo D. West, Jr. (Secretary of the Army). *America's Army of the 21st Century: Force XXI*. Fort Monroe VA: Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Director, Louisiana Maneuvers, 15 January 1995

⁶⁰ There were also a small number of regular Army and Filipino forces that withstood the Japanese onslaught against the Philippines for several months from late 1941 to mid-1942.

U.S. Army reduced to under a million soldiers by June 1947.⁶¹ Increasing tensions with the Soviet Union in the developing Cold War as well as continued occupation duties in Japan and Germany nonetheless sustained a larger peacetime establishment for the Army than at any other time in U.S. history. The 1949 Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb and the North Korean aggression against South Korea in June 1950 dramatically refocused national security attention. By the end of the Korean War, the sustained nature of the Cold War was clear. Preparation for war with the Soviet Union provided clarity for the Army's effort. Other operations were subordinate to this priority.

For the Army, the challenge was to define its role within President Eisenhower's national strategy that emphasized massive nuclear retaliation and that sought to avoid the potential economic dislocations of high defense expenditures.⁶² The President, who emphasized nuclear weapons, was the most respected American military leader (and a former Army officer no less). The Army had little recourse than to adjust to the budget stringency imposed upon it as a consequence of this policy. As Army Chief of Staff from 1955-59, Gen Maxwell Taylor instituted a series of radical changes to army force structure to better operate on the nuclear battlefield. This restructuring was referred to as the Pentomic Army. The Pentomic army reorganized combat divisions with five combat maneuver elements of slightly larger than battalion size. These battle groups would be spread over greater distances on the battlefield as a means to limit the damage to army units by the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. These more dispersed formations were assumed be more likely to survive nuclear assault and be able to meet follow on

⁶¹ Meese, *Defense Decision Making Under Budget Stringency*, 116.

⁶² President Eisenhower's strategy was called the New Look. For an excellent description of the strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, especially chapters five and six, 127-197.

conventional military attacks.⁶³ It represented a bold and dramatic adaptation to the anticipated effects of the nuclear RMA. It was not, however, a change widely accepted by the profession. Shortly after Taylor's retirement, the Army restructured to eliminate the Pentomic divisions and return to a more traditional configuration.⁶⁴

Even though the Army was relegated to secondary importance by the emphasis on nuclear weapons, it was still larger than at any other time in U.S. history. This provided yet another educational imperative. To meet the education and professional development needs of a much larger standing force, the service school enrollments from the Military Academy through the Army War College more than doubled.⁶⁵ Additionally, the roles of Army officers in military occupation and the increasingly global scope of U.S. actions induced a greater emphasis on strategic studies within the Army professional development system.

Occupation duty in Japan and Germany, the Korean War, and the anticipated nuclear battlefield represented diverse challenges for the Army. The effectiveness of the Army in preparing the profession for the future was at best mixed. With regard to the Soviet Union and the central confrontation of the Cold War, the Army appears to have been clearly focused and prepared. The absence of war with the Soviet Union may be in part attributed to the successful deterrent contributions of the Army. In the war in Vietnam, however, the Army's conventional war concept was a significant contributing factor to military ineffectiveness.⁶⁶ The complex military demands of counterinsurgency exceeded the capacity of the conventional war army. The Army's lack of understanding

⁶³ A.J.Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 142.

⁶⁵ Meese, *Defense Decision Making Under Budget Stringency*, 165-167.

of essential aspects of military operations other than war left it ill-suited to the mission at hand. Lack of vision or insight by Army leaders in anticipating and preparing for this role contributed to this failure. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, rather than acknowledge and address this shortcoming, the Army's leaders worked conscientiously to exclude such missions from the Army's repertoire.

1972-1982: End of the Vietnam War and the All-Volunteer army

Recovering from the Vietnam War, the Army underwent a significant transformation from a draft-based force to an all volunteer force. It also went all out to refocus its intellectual energy on clarifying its missions and responsibilities to address concerns of institutional inadequacy coming out of the institutional trauma of Vietnam.

The recovery of the Army in the late 1970s and 1980s was remarkable. A clarity of strategic vision led to the creation of AirLand Battle doctrine. This doctrine focused on the daunting challenge of the continued Soviet threat and was formulated primarily with regard to the projected battlefield in central Europe. The Army optimized its force in relation to this clear, dangerous foe. The structure, doctrine and training of the U.S. Army were rationalized to fit this dominant threat.

There are many manifestations of this focus. The National Training Center was created with the intent of training and testing US Army units against the 'Best Soviet unit' in the world (the full time opposing force).

At the same time, the US Army sought to improve its personnel management system to address some of the problems identified during the Vietnam era. In particular, the old boy networks of assignment and positioning were replaced by a centralized system of personnel management. This included centralized assignment, promotion and

⁶⁶ Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

selection processes to better manage the entire force more fairly and equitably. Career assignment templates were designed to reflect the sequential positioning and development of officers over time as they rose slowly through a variety of positions in similar units. Command and staff assignments within individual branch specialties eased officers forward to greater levels of responsibility within their branches.

In the early 1970's, Army leaders conducted an important re-evaluation of the profession with far-reaching influence.⁶⁷ Army leaders were driven to this by a few important external factors. Internationally, the overriding element guiding the Army was the continuing Cold War and the important mission to defend the central front in Europe against possible attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Also very important was the impending end of conscription and the transition to become an all-volunteer force. This required a change to the fundamental character of the Army at the same time as the soul-searching reassessment of the Army's role following the Vietnam War.

The end of the Vietnam War represented a very troubling time for the Army. In the latter stages of the war, the Army had come under immense public criticism and often outright vilification. One response to the anti-military protests of the Vietnam War was President Nixon's promise to abolish the military draft by 1973. As the primary beneficiary of the draft, the Army had to make the greatest changes to account for its end.⁶⁸ Moreover, due to the unpopularity of military service in the latter stages of the war as well as numerous draft exemptions, the quality of the Army suffered massively. The Army of the early seventies was unpopular, filled with poor quality draftees, and in a

⁶⁷ Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell and Jane Mahaffey, *Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership in the United States Army*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, 151-152.

crisis of confidence. Additionally, studies by the Army War College in 1970 and 1971 found that the Army's officer professionalism was in a serious state of disrepair and disrepute.⁶⁹

During the Vietnam War, the policies established for the purposes of individual equity—twelve-month rotations in Vietnam and six-month command tours—dominated personnel management. Individuals went to Vietnam, commanded briefly, hopefully impressed senior officers who might remember them, then left, having had their “ticket punched.” This contributed to soldiers' perceptions that their leaders were not technically competent, committed, or caring. Senior officers selected their subordinate commanders based upon those they knew from previous assignments perpetuating the perception that it was “who an officer knew and not what he knew” that mattered.⁷⁰

In response, the Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, instituted several reforms to improve the officer personnel management system. Foremost among the reforms was the creation of the officer personnel management system to centralize command and promotion processes and end many of the egregious practices of old-boy networking and favoritism that had come to dominate the system.⁷¹

Army leaders were stung by the outcome of the Vietnam War and the accusations of Army failure. An important concern of Army leaders was that a lack of domestic popular support had undermined the mission. In particular, this was the first major war fought by the United States that did not involve a significant call up of militia or reserve units to participate. Because President Johnson was able to prosecute the Vietnam War using the active military with no call up of reserves, one key effort by post-Vietnam War Army leaders was to restructure the total army force to create a role for reserves that

⁶⁸ Ibid, 153.

⁶⁹ U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 30 June 1970 and U.S. Army War College, Leadership for the 1970s (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 20 October 1971. Cited in Meese, 211-212.

⁷⁰ Meese, *Defense Decision Making Under Budget Stringency*, 247.

⁷¹ Ibid, 212.

would make it very difficult for civilian leaders to order extended military operations without a call up.⁷² To support this effort, Federal Reserve forces were realigned to incorporate a high proportion of the combat service support elements instead of combat units. Additionally, several active army divisions were restructured such that one of their maneuver brigades would be a "round-out" unit from the National Guard.

Abrams built into the sixteen-division structure a reliance on reserves such that the force could not function without them, and hence could not be deployed without calling them up. This was a very deliberate response to the price in blood and sacrifice the Army had been forced to pay in lieu of reserve mobilization [during the Vietnam War].⁷³

By reducing the number of critical combat service support units in the active force and moving them to the federal reserve, it would be very difficult for American political leaders to order an extended army mission without also calling up a portion of the reserves to participate in the mission.⁷⁴

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War provided a valuable example of contemporary conventional warfare. With the smaller Israeli force, largely equipped by the U.S. and other western countries, and the much larger Arab forces, mainly equipped by the Soviet Union, the Yom Kippur War provided a glimpse of the equipment and tactics to fight outnumbered and win that might apply to Europe. Army leaders sought to simplify the Army's focus on the enduring, conventional warfighting mission, particularly as it applied to the European Central front. Army leaders developed a consensus on the need to improve professional expertise to fight outnumbered and win. Related to this was an effort to reject missions other than the central warfighting focus that might divert

⁷² Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: From the Battle of the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times*, (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1998), 364.

⁷³ Ibid, 363-364.

attention and energy. Counterinsurgency missions, largely discredited within the Army leadership, were among the missions rejected as outside of the mainstream emphasis on large-scale conventional war.

One important result of this focus on the Soviet Union was significant change to the Army's professional education system. Before the Vietnam War, the focus of the Army's education system was on the preparation of officers for leadership of an expanded army in wartime.

The army's postwar education model was based on a World War II style expansible army in which officer prepared to fill positions significantly above their current level of experience in war. With the Vietnam experience and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Army leadership concluded that officers needed more *training* in preparation for their current or next job, rather than esoteric discussions of higher-level commands.⁷⁵

To better focus on the immediate mission at hand--to deter or, if need be, defeat the Soviet Union--placed greater emphasis on schools as a mechanism to train officers for the more immediate assignments they could anticipate after school. Complementary to the change in the emphasis of army schools, the Army also increased funding and support for officers to attain civilian graduate education.

A smaller peacetime army placed greater emphasis not only on an officer's military education but his advanced civilian education as well, and a graduate education in the seventies became almost obligatory in an officer's career path.⁷⁶

In 1973, Army leaders also consolidated doctrinal development and training organizations to create a new, overarching Training and Doctrine Command

⁷⁴ An oft-cited example of the success of this approach is the Persian Gulf War. Early in the Desert Shield portion of the operation, the President called up reserve units to provide support to the active force as it began to deploy to Southwest Asia.

⁷⁵ Meese, *Defense Decision Making Under Budget Stringency*, 249. My emphasis added.

⁷⁶ Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell and Jane Mahaffey, *Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership in the United States Army*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 149.

(TRADOC).⁷⁷ This consolidation helped the Army to better focus on the conceptual underpinning of its roles and missions. From 1972 to 1982, these leaders of the Vietnam era developed a clear doctrinal statement, AirLand Battle doctrine, and instituted a comprehensive formalization of army training techniques (performance oriented training, combat training centers, after action reviews, etc) leading to demonstrably heightened proficiency in warfighting skills.

The result of this period was an army leadership very clearly focused on preparation for major conventional war with the Soviet Union. Issues of counterinsurgency failure in Vietnam were pushed aside to refocus on the dominant, armor-heavy, conventional maneuver of World War II style. This focused force was enormously successful in the Persian Gulf War.

1990-2001: Post-Cold War Era: Challenges and Uncertainty

As the Soviet Union began to change under President Gorbachev, there were many within the Army who recognized the dramatic shift in the international environment. Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, increasing openness (glasnost), and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, many Army leaders saw that the decreasing threat on the European central front would have important consequences for the Army. As General Colin Powell noted in 1989, the Soviets were no longer the Devil of the west that they once were. Noting an old saw, Powell suggested to other Army leaders that the issue of the Army's role after the demise of the Soviet Union would be like that of preachers after the Devil's death.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ John L. Romjue, *American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War*, Washington D.C.: Military History Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997, 15.

⁷⁸ Colin L. Powell, "National Security Challenges in the 1990s: The Future Just Ain't what it Used to be." *Army*, 39, no. 7 (July 1989): 12-14.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell anticipated the calls for post-Cold War demobilization by creating and receiving approval for the Base Force plan that would reduce the armed forces by 25%.⁷⁹ The plan was first publicized on the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Although the implementation of the plan was deferred until after the Gulf War, it nonetheless started the process of post-Cold War draw down of U.S. armed forces. The formal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 merely reinforced the conclusions that Powell had previously drawn.

The Army that went to the Gulf War had prepared for high intensity conventional combat operations against a peer competitor. Fortunately, the Army was never called upon to meet the formidable Red Army in battle. Instead, it was unleashed against the forces of a second-class regional power. The Army was incredibly successful during the decisive rout of Iraqi forces. The revitalized Army of the post-Vietnam era was seemingly vindicated.

Months after the Gulf War success, the Soviet Union itself disintegrated. This increased the pressure for draw down of the American armed forces. Over the next decade, however, this smaller force was increasingly involved in missions other than war. Missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo all entailed long term commitment of army units. As with previous peacetime eras, the immediate use of army forces for other missions did not alter the Army's emphasis on warfighting capabilities geared towards similarly configured opponents.

A major difference in this post-Cold War era was the status of the United States in the international system. With no peer competitor, the United States was in a unique

⁷⁹ Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force: 1989-1992*, Washington D.C.: The Joint History Office, 1993, 12.

situation relative to previous U.S. history. Furthermore, the United States benefited from a very favorable international environment. To sustain this favorable situation, the U.S. remained closely engaged around the world. Frequent military operations other than war were part of this effort to sustain a beneficial status quo.

The effectiveness of the Army in the period since the Gulf War was mixed. There was professional dissonance between the mission to 'fight and win the nation's wars' and the frequent use of the Army in operations other than war. The adjustments required to accomplish these missions with units organized for war has often been ad hoc. The long and uncertain duration of missions such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, strain the resources of the force in unexpected ways. The missions also demanded skills often at odds with the expertise and expectations of the individuals responsible for their execution. The nature of expected professional expertise and the appropriate jurisdictions for its application has been unclear and has been a source of tension and debate.

History of the Army Profession: Overview and Summary

Table 1 summarizes some of the elements related to the Army's professional development since the Civil War with a brief summary future parallels.

Table 1: Summary of elements influencing army professionalism:

		1865-98	1898-1916	1918-39	1945-60	1972-82	1990-2001	Future(?) FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANT
Description		Professional Seeds	Professionals Defined	Competent Cadre	Cold War Confusion	Hollow but focused	Triumphant but Uncertain	
Key leaders		Sherman, Upton	Root	Pershing, MacArthur	Taylor	Westmoreland, Abrams	???	???
Impetus		Civil War & Prussian example	Spanish-American War	WWI & Industrial RMA	WWII, Korea, Nuclear RMA	Post-Vietnam & VOLAR	End of Cold War	<i>Information RMA & global leadership</i>
Threats	War	Indians	Great Powers	Great Powers	USSR + Allies, Nuclear War	USSR + Allies	2 x Major Theater Wars	<i>Near-peer/ Great power</i>
	MOOTW	Southern occupation & labor unrest	Colonial constabulary, PI Counter Insurgency	Philippine constabulary, CCC	Postwar occupation duty	n/a	Peace Ops (Somalia, Haiti, B-H, Kosovo)	<i>Counter-Terrorism, asymmetric attacks, Peace Ops</i>
U.S. International disposition		Isolation [Continental Power—'Manifest Destiny' realized]	Imperialism [Budding Great Power]	Isolation [Great Power in Hiding]	Bi-polar Balancing [Superpower]	Bi-polar Détente [Chastened Superpower]	Engagement & Enlargement [Hyperpower]	<i>International Leadership [Guiding Power]</i>
Assessment of strategic leadership		Prophetic but ineffective	Effective but incomplete	Effective and overwhelming success	Mixed effectiveness [ineffective re: Vietnam]	Effective but narrow	Professional Tension	<i>Profession Clarified?</i>

One significant aspect is that much of what influences the definition of the Army profession is external to the profession. Strategic leaders of the Army profession in the past have had to react to these changing circumstances in order to guide the profession's development.

The bridge from one historical period to the next is effectiveness in subsequent military operations. The overarching explanation of effectiveness connects in the following manner:

Following the Civil War, the Army found itself in the distasteful role of occupying the South and at the same time still responsible for its difficult role of securing the frontier. An additional and also distasteful role for the Army was breaking domestic strikes. The preferred professional concept for Army leaders was to model themselves on the great power armies of Europe, especially Prussia. Sherman and Upton provided a superb vision of what this professional, great power army would look like and the changes that would be required to achieve it. Their efforts to immediately implement changes were generally unsuccessful. They were unable to receive congressional support for most of the changes they desired but were able to create or reorient educational institutions (e.g., West Point, the Infantry and Cavalry school at Leavenworth) to help realize part of their vision.

The Spanish-American War highlighted the wisdom of Upton's analysis and with the support of Elihu Root, attained greater success in shaping the Army. The creation of the Army War College, the refined role of Fort Leavenworth as the Command and General Staff College, and clarification of reserve roles laid the groundwork that proved effective in the Army's success in World War I and World War II.

World War I demonstrated the soundness of the Army's professional vision but overwhelmed the Army's capacity because of the scope of the operation. The size of the mobilized army as well as the lack of American military industry, highlighted serious deficiencies in the Army's preparations. After World War I, the focus on great power conflict was clear and the Army did sustain a clear vision of its role. This included the concentration on professional education and a clear understanding of the Army's role in

national mobilization (of both personnel and industry). The resulting improvements yielded exceptional effectiveness in World War II.

The decade following World War II was one of some professional confusion for the Army. Immediately following the war, traditional demobilization took place along with the occupation of the two major defeated powers. Even before the demobilization was complete, however, new tensions with its erstwhile Soviet ally created a need to maintain a focus on war preparation. Initially caught off guard by the beginning of the Korean War, the U.S. Army recovered to restore the status quo in a limited conflict. Additionally, the nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union created entirely new challenges for the Army. Its very relevance in the context of strategic nuclear war was questioned. The Pentomic Army concept was a novel response to the professional threat. For all the confusion and complexity of the new security challenges, the Army was largely unprepared for the challenges of its next major war—Vietnam.

The counterinsurgency war was not what army leaders had prepared for and was a mission they did not want to embrace. When preferred warfighting methods proved unsuccessful, the Army had a very difficult time adapting. With efforts that proved too little, too late, the Army left Vietnam defeated, discouraged, and discredited. In the effort to save the institution and rehabilitate it, Army leaders sought a clear definition of their professional responsibility. The result was a narrow focus on the demands of large-scale conventional war similar to its experience in World War II. With the Soviet conventional threat uppermost, this focus was easy to justify. The result was a revitalized and highly skilled force that demonstrated its prowess in heavy-armored combat during the Persian Gulf War.

In the years following the Persian Gulf War, the Army was to some degree a victim of its own success. Convinced of its wisdom in severely delimiting the accepted definition of the Army's overarching mission (fight and win the nation's wars), Army leaders had a difficult time sustaining professional commitment and satisfaction among its officers in the face of numerous peace operations of the post-Cold War era. The confusion between the accepted professional self-identify as warriors and the numerous demands of missions other than war contributed to a professional crisis within the officer corps. This crisis continues to pose a challenge to current army leaders. They must now clarify the appropriate professional expertise and jurisdiction that will guide the Army's professional development in the uncertain and tumultuous era ahead.

Chapter 3: Contemporary Challenges: Critical External Factors

There are three critical factors external to the Army profession that will have a major impact on the Army's ability to clarify its expertise and jurisdictions. In particular, the effects of rapid technological change and the information RMA, the uncertain international environment within which the United States operates, and the competition that takes place between the Army and other professions within a system of professions.

The opening paragraph of the latest capstone Army manual, FM 1, captures the enduring essence of the Army's mission and the implicit responsibilities of the Army's professional leaders.

The Army serves the Nation. We defend America's Constitution and our way of life. We protect America's security and our Nation's interests. We answer the Nation's call to serve whenever and wherever required. We must prepare for decisive action in all operations. But above all, we are ready to fight and win the Nation's wars—our nonnegotiable contract with the American people. The Army is, and will remain, the preeminent land warfighting force in the world. We serve as the ultimate guarantor of our way of life.⁸⁰

The first line identifies the Army's fundamental commitment to serve society. This is the touchstone of the Army professional ethic that endures from the republic's founding. We serve American society and society's needs dictate our responsibilities. All else flows from this. The paragraph also contains the enduring core of the Army's professional expertise--to be the preeminent land warfighting force "ready to fight and win the Nation's wars."

But the paragraph also contains an open-ended catchall: "We must prepare for decisive action in all operations." This sentence recognizes that there is room for interpretation and flexibility. It is with respect to this commitment that Army leaders are

most challenged to clarify the appropriate elements of army expertise and the Army's professional jurisdiction.

As the preceding history section noted, the recent era has been characterized by tremendous change and uncertainty. Like the period following World War I, we find ourselves in the midst of a potential revolution in military affairs that may fundamentally alter the nature of warfare and, hence, the Army profession. The experience of the post Korean War Pentomic army reforms as a response to the nuclear RMA should caution us against trendy solutions tailored to external audiences but poorly inculcated within the profession. The strength of professional identity is a function both of legitimacy established by the client (society) as well as internal acceptance and acculturation by the members of the profession.

The challenge for strategic leaders is to clarify the external context within which the Army will operate. This context will critically affect the nature of the Army expert knowledge and the jurisdictions within which this expertise should be legitimately applied. There are two critical elements of the profession's current external context. The first is the effect of the information driven revolution in military affairs and the second is highly uncertain international security environment in the wake of the Cold War.

Rapid Technological Change and the Information RMA

It is generally accepted that we are in the midst of an information age revolution in military affairs (RMA) that is creating dramatically different challenges for warfare and national security. This RMA is generally understood as computer/automation driven changes that have significant effects on several dimensions of warfare. It affects the speed of command and control. It affects the capacity of intelligence systems and sensors

⁸⁰ Department of the Army, *FM 1: The Army*, 14 June 2001, 1.

to dissipate (though not eliminate) the fog of war. It makes possible precision, long range, and devastating attack. The complete outlines of this revolution, if indeed it is one, are still unclear. Do these automation-enhanced systems represent a revolutionary change in the velocity of warfare or are these simply evolutionary improvements in well-established intelligence, targeting and attack systems? In either case, it does appear that the scope, lethality, and speed of modern warfare are dramatically different than anything witnessed in history.

There have been other RMAs in the past; however, in most of the situations where the Army has had to adapt to a new style of warfare, other countries have generally led the way. The critical tasks for the U.S. Army have not been to innovate, but simply to learn from the efforts (or mistakes) of others. That is not the case in the present era. The United States Army is recognized as the most advanced and capable in the world. Given the unique global interests and position of the government the Army serves, the United States Army is in a vastly different position than it has been for most of its history. Potential opponents are well aware of our recent actions—successes and failures—and can take the initiative to challenge our vulnerabilities and avoid our strengths. In other words, as we have witnessed so dramatically since 11 September 2001, we are most likely to be challenged by enemies using asymmetric capabilities.

There has been a long-term historical trend towards decentralized control and devolution of important decision-making authority to lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. The information RMA seems to accelerate this trend. Increasingly dispersed and numerically smaller formations exercise greater influence on the outcomes of land operations. The same important influence of leaders and soldiers at lower tactical

echelons and over wide geographical areas also applies to operations other than war (such as peacekeeping missions) where small groups of soldiers or individual soldiers have the power to dramatically influence operational and even strategic objectives through their actions.⁸¹

As we envision greater situational awareness throughout our forces, facilitated by advanced communications technology, we must also contemplate the challenges that such awareness will generate in the leaders and units.

The Strategic and political environment can indeed create a climate conducive to innovation. The elements in such change, however, occur within organizations themselves. It is the interplay between past experiences, individual leaders and innovators, and the cultural climate within military organizations that determines how successfully innovation proceeds.⁸²

There are two major concerns that stem from the increasingly networked and aware units. One is that leaders will micromanage their forces with the enhanced capacities of new systems.⁸³ The other is that lower level leaders or soldiers will *macro* manage a situation since they have a high degree of situational awareness to use in judging for themselves which actions are appropriate (for example, the decision to use deadly force by a soldier on patrol in a peacekeeping mission).⁸⁴ The pitfalls of either extreme require a clear understanding of new professional standards by Army leaders at all levels. While leaders at all levels must be more broadly aware and capable of understanding what is happening at levels above, below and laterally, they must

⁸¹ Gregg F. Martin and Jeffrey D. McCausland, "The Role of Strategic Leaders for the Future Army Profession," in Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 427.

⁸² Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare: The British, French and German experiences," in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., *Innovation in the Interwar Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 18.

⁸³ Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell, "The Digital Battlefield: What Army Transformation Efforts Say about Its Future Professional Jurisdiction," in Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 137.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 135.

nonetheless have a clear sense of a division of labor that can prevent unnecessary redundancy as well as to clearly delineate the realms for initiative and creativity. Moreover, this requires a high degree of psychological maturity that may be lacking at the lower levels of the military hierarchy where we are increasing the demands and responsibilities.⁸⁵

A further complicating dynamic is that while the scope and dispersion of forces has increased, the time within which decisive results are likely to be achieved has decreased. The ability to conduct protracted mobilization, extensive pre-deployment training, and then deploy massed forces over long distances after a crisis has begun is less likely in the information age. The ability to meet a diverse array of contemporary security challenges (the goal of "full spectrum dominance") rests increasingly on the readily available armed forces in being. It is also likely that these units' first battles or other actions will be decisive ones. This leaves less room for learning and adaptation in the midst of such rapidly decided operations. Therefore, our leaders must come prepared with an extensive base of education, training and practical experience that can guide them in identifying challenges and developing appropriate responses. Simple application of rote battle drill or standard operating procedures will be less common. To be sure, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and doctrine can help guide our leaders. But, there is an increasing need for sound judgment and intellectual insight on the part of ever more junior leaders to tailor military actions to fit appropriately within the context of complex social, cultural and political events. This is the quintessential application of professional judgment--diagnosis, inference and treatment--relying on abstract

⁸⁵ George B. Forsythe, Scott Snook, Philip Lewis, and Paul T. Bartone, "Making Sense of Officership: Developing a Professional Identity for 21st Century Army Officers," In Snider and Watkins. *The Future of*

knowledge (not standard operating procedures or routines). This suggests the need for greater emphasis on education versus training as the foundation of life-long learning and adaptation.

Uncertain International Environment.

Today's environment demands more from Army leaders than ever before. The Army needs adaptive leaders—leaders that can successfully operate across the range of military operations.⁸⁶

Since the end of the Cold War, it had become increasingly clear that the international environment and the technological context of warfare represent fundamentally different challenges. A system optimized for a relatively slow pace of organizational change and evolution is having difficulty adapting to the rapid changes and uncertainty of the international system.

There's an old saying: 'You train for certainty; you educate for uncertainty.' If we're very sure of what the world's going to be like, then we can train them very well -- train the hell out of them, But let me tell you, the battlefield of the future is going to be uncertain, ambiguous, violent and cruel.⁸⁷

Unlike the Cold War era, the Army does not have a clear enemy and a clear sector. Overall, the international security environment is more favorable and less threatening than it was during the Cold War. However, the nature of the direct threats to vital U.S. interests is more obscure. Hence, the armed forces must be prepared for a wider array of possible threats and dangers. Shifting international political and security domains resist easy classification and management. In many circumstances, enduring alliances give way to coalitions of the willing and able participants—many with differing

the Army Profession, 375-77.

⁸⁶ Department of the Army, *FM 1: The Army*, 14 June 2001, 12.

interests and motivations that defy easy integration. This will pose a continuing challenge.

Competition in a System of Professions.

Throughout US history, the other military services represented regular competitors with the Army for the legitimacy to perform certain roles and missions in various jurisdictions. The legitimate distinctions and divisions of labor among the services are represented by key legislative decisions ultimately grounded on the foundation of the United States Constitution. In recent years, the competition for professional control over various jurisdictions has expanded to include other government agencies and non-state actors (domestic and international) in accomplishing the policy aims of American society. So, even as a public institution with a public charter, competition within the system of professions is still an important element of the Army's professional domain. Strategic leaders of the Army profession must recognize this dynamic, competitive context in clarifying the appropriate role of the Army.

This time of fluid challenges and uncertain responses creates a window of opportunity for increased professional competition. Other military services, other government and private agencies compete with the Army to address national security concerns. Although there have not been suggestions that we eliminate the Army, many responsibilities associated with the Army have been challenged and claimed by others. Moreover, laudable service in missions that have little to do with the use of coercive force challenge core professional jurisdictions. These other missions blur public understanding of the Army's core roles. It is therefore easier to challenge other roles.

⁸⁷ Maj. Gen. Robert Scales Jr. quoted by Staff Sgt. Kathleen T. Rhem, "Tomorrow's Grunts Need To Be Cream of Crop," *American Forces Press Service*, Aug. 31, 2000,

The other military services challenge the Army's role to dominate land combat with competing claims to battlespace dominance that blur distinctions of separate air, sea, and land domains. Even regarding land warfare, the rapid, expeditionary use of Marines challenges central claims of the Army's relevance and importance (note the recent operations in Afghanistan—a land-locked country no less!).

Contracting out training of Army officers (within the ROTC program) and contracting out the training of foreign armies represent further competition in areas previously lead by the Army. Additionally, in a variety of MOOTW missions, Army claims and efforts compete with international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Summary

These elements of external context will affect Army leaders in defining the profession. Changes in technology, the international environment and professional competition within the system of professions premise the need for Army adaptation. The strategic leaders of the Army profession must provide the framework for this adaptation. This includes greater emphasis on versatility, flexibility and adaptability at both the individual and the institutional level. Priority must be on human development (how to learn) as a foundation of life-long learning and self-improvement. Training should receive secondary emphasis for developing the specific, but perishable, skills of this fluid era. These challenges require clear articulation of principles and priorities of professional practice.

Chapter 4: Army Professional Revitalization Efforts

The previous chapters have presented a framework for strategic leaders of the Army profession. The most important thread is the need to define the profession clearly so that the Army will have a coherent framework to make specific decisions about expertise, jurisdictions and the appropriate manner to develop professionals to meet the profession's needs.

The Army has not been idle in trying to figure out how to accommodate many of the challenges that I have identified. However, in the absence of a clear conceptual framework to govern the process for professional transformation, parts of the problem have been addressed in a disjointed and ad hoc manner.

The efforts in recent years have been varied and multi-faceted. There are serious and well-intended efforts taking place in many offices around the Army to revitalize the Army to meet the perceived demands of the changing era. In particular, the Army has developed an aggressive campaign plan to transform the Army from the legacy force of the Cold War era, through an interim force of the next 10-20 years, to the objective force of 2032. The focus of these efforts is on the creation of a strategically and operationally agile, rapidly deployable force capable of success across the full spectrum of conflict.⁸⁸

General Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, enunciated a bold vision for the Army soon after he took the reigns in October 1999. Shinseki recognized that the Army lacked strategic mobility for its heavy forces and lacked firepower and protection for its light forces. To meet the challenges of the future, General Shinseki established the goal of being able to move a brigade sized force anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a

complete division within 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.⁸⁹ This is an extremely ambitious agenda. To get from the current (legacy) force to the future (objective) force, the Army is in the midst of creating an interim force of medium weight brigades equipped with light armored vehicles.⁹⁰

Commensurate with this revised organizational focus is the reformulation of the Army's purpose and functions in the latest Army capstone manual, *FM 1: The Army*. Acknowledging the demands of the past decade, the richer description of Army functions moves beyond the enduring responsibility to 'fight and win the nation's wars' to include emphasis on the capacity to achieve full spectrum dominance. The Army core competencies are:

- Shape the Security Environment... [Includes presence, military-to-military contacts, encourage democratic institutions]
- Prompt Response... [includes response to natural or man-made disasters, as well as expeditionary operations.]
- Mobilize the Army... [to include support, if needed, for protracted major conventional war]
- Forcible Entry Operations...
- Sustained Land dominance... across the full range of military operations and the spectrum of conflict. [Supporting competencies include:]
 - Close With and Destroy Enemy Forces...
 - Precision Fires and Maneuver...
 - Information Superiority...
 - Command and Control of Joint and Multinational Forces...
 - Control and Defend Land, People and Natural Resources. ...
 - Conduct sustainment Operations...
- Support Civil Authorities [includes, inter alia, homeland security and defense, disaster relief, and interagency work]⁹¹

⁸⁸ For details, see U.S. Army, *Concepts for the Objective Force*. United States Army White Paper. Undated. Available from <http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/oftf/pages/briefings.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 May 2002.

⁸⁹ By way of contrast, it took almost six months to deploy a similar number of heavy divisions to southwest Asia during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91.

⁹⁰ These are the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).

⁹¹ *FM 1: The Army*, 22-24. Items in brackets paraphrase information in the supporting paragraphs for each competency. Titles are a direct quote.

Notable is the absence of any priorities among these tasks other than the requirement to fight and win wars (the number one priority).

The Army will remain capable of fighting and winning our Nation's wars and will be prepared to perform any other mission across the spectrum of conflict. The Army's core competencies enable Army forces to carry out any mission, anytime, anywhere in the world.⁹²

This high level vision from General Shinseki naturally includes second and third order implications that touch on virtually every aspect of the Army. The changes that will ultimately be required to realize this ambitious vision are likely to reach every corner of the institution. Consequently, there have been many initiatives undertaken to adjust the Army to meet the needs of the future. Overall, this is captured in the Army Transformation campaign plan.⁹³ Training and leader development is one of 14 lines of operation in the campaign. This chapter briefly identifies and explains several of the programs recently undertaken or currently underway that relate to the issues of this study in clarifying the future responsibilities of the Army profession.

One of the missing aspects of these efforts is an explicit focus on the nature of the Army *as a profession* and a clear map of the future *of the profession*. Implicitly, the current approach seems to accept as given that the profession is the same as the institution.

Recent or Ongoing Efforts to Revitalize the Army Profession

Since the end of the Cold War, and in particular in the last four years, there have been many efforts to understand how the changes affect the Army's ability to effectively

⁹² Ibid, 24.

⁹³ The Transformation campaign plan is the plan to adapt the Army forces of today to become the objective force of the future. U.S. Army, *Army Transformation and the Campaign Plan*. Briefing slides. 14 August 2001. Available from <http://leav-www.army.mil/NSC/DOWNLOADFILES/LESD/14Aug01NSC%20IPR-ATCP.ppt>. Internet. Accessed 5 June 2002.

accomplish its mission in support of national security policy. (Such efforts include the Officer Professional Management System update for the 21st Century (OPMS XXI), the Army Training and Leader Development Panels (ATLDP), the creation of Army Accession Command to standardize and rationalize the efforts to bring in new soldiers and officers, the creation of the Simon Center for Professional Military Ethics (SCPME) at the United States Military Academy with responsibility to clarify the nature of officership and the professional military ethic, and programs to better align the standards of USMA and ROTC pre-commissioning programs, and contracted studies to improve the officer education system (OES) from company grade through intermediate level.⁹⁴)

OPMS XXI

One of the most prominent and far reaching efforts to alter the professional development and assignment system is Officer Professional Management System XXI (OPMS XXI). Initiated in 1996, OPMS XXI was an attempt to better balance institutional needs for both specialists and generalists.⁹⁵ OPMS XXI represents initiatives to provide opportunities for officers to attain greater specialized expertise in areas of great value to the Army. Officers are given the opportunity to select designation into specialties that will place them in a career management tracks differentiated by their overall role in support of the Army. The central career field is the Operational Career Field (OPCF) that is made up of the traditional field branches of the Army (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Quartermaster, Military Intelligence, etc). The Army's future tactical, operational and strategic leaders will come from this career field. That is, this

⁹⁴ A civilian contractor, CUBIC has completed the study for the intermediate level education (ILE) Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). CUBIC's similar study of the company grade OES programs is due June 2002.

career field will be the source of commanders at the battalion, brigade, division, corps and therefore ultimately joint commanders at the JTF and combatant command level. In addition to this easily recognizable and largely traditional group of Army leaders, OPMS XXI is intended to give officers the opportunity to develop long term specialization in particular functional areas that are of tremendous value to the Army but are not well suited to the short term assignments and variegated experiences generated by the rotation policies of the operational forces.

After approximately 10 years of service in one of the Army's basic operational branches, officers can request designation into one of the three career fields. The three career fields include the Operations Support Career Field, the Institutional Support Career Field and the Information Operations Career Field. Offering essentially a second Army career, these non-operational functional areas allow a much higher degree of specialization for the selected officers without requiring them to compete with their peers in the operational force. Their promotion and selection opportunities will be managed separately from the operational forces for promotion and assignment.

In the past, the Army treated all officers as members of the same pool with the exception of a few special branches (medical, legal and chaplain). Since the central career template for success was operational (combat arms, combat support and combat service support), those officers who spent too much time away from the operational force, either in schools or functional area assignments, were not very competitive for promotion against peers who had more assignments and experience in the operational force. The practical impact was the acquisition of valuable skills and experience by

⁹⁵ Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1 October 1998, 4.

several officers—either through advanced civil schooling or particular specialized assignments—who then reached a career 'brick wall' about the time that their seasoning and maturity in their specialties would be of most value to the Army. The particular manifestation was the retirement of Lieutenant Colonels shortly after reaching eligibility at 20 years. The fact that most such specialized officers would generally not be selected for Colonel (a selection that generally occurs at approximately 22 years of service) removed incentives for advancement and recognition within the Army at the point when their value to the institution would likely be the greatest. In their stead, the position within those specialized functions often went to successful members of the operational forces who were not well qualified for non-operational specialized tasks.

OPMS XXI represents a potential win-win situation for the officer corps and the Army as a whole. Those officers retained in the Operational Career Field now have great opportunity to focus on their branch assignments with less likelihood that valuable development positions (so called "branch qualifying" positions) would be shared with officers who were merely interested in retaining currency (punching their ticket) in the dominant promotion pathway. Similarly, the specialty assignments beyond the operational force that require greater specialization would be able to season officers who would no longer need to interrupt their progressive development of expertise to run back to the field for a few years. Additionally, this reduced the related need to fill such specialized positions with successful operational officers (former battalion commanders and brigade commanders) who attained promotion but were not well suited to specialized demands.

OPMS XXI is a positive change for the Army that has tremendous potential to successfully improve the quality of the operational force while at the same time developing, retaining and advancing officers with expertise critical to the Army's various professional jurisdictions. The system has recently completed full implementation to include its incorporation as a key criteria of centralized selection and promotion boards (the means by which officers are promoted and designated for attendance at key schools). It will still take a few years to assess whether the system has accomplished its initial intent to provide a healthy mix of operational leaders as well as other officer specialists to meet the Army's overall needs.

Army Training and Leadership Development Panels

In June 2000, under the guidance of General Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army began a series of panels to study the training and leader development of officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and Army civilians. "The Panel compiled and analyzed data from more than 13,500 leaders, using comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research."⁹⁶ The panel analyzed the survey results and suggested possible solutions.⁹⁷

To date, only the officer panel has been completed. The panels are a one-time efforts to assess the state of Army training and leader development systems as they relate to each other. The most important conclusions of the officer study of the ATLDP were that the Army lacks a leadership development model. This oversight has allowed the

⁹⁶ Army Training and Leader Development Panel, Officer Study, Final Report to the Army, OS-7.

⁹⁷ For an excellent summary of the process and structure of the ATLDP as well as details about the officer study, see Joe LeBoeuf, "Three Case Studies on the Army's Internal Jurisdictions, Case No. 3: The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel," Chapter 22 in Snider and Watkins, *Future of the Army Profession*, 487-504. Colonel Joe LeBoeuf "...served as study group team chief (Army Service Study Group) for the officer's study, and a member of the executive panel for follow-on meetings and briefings through the summer of 2001." Endnote 53, 502.

Cold War system of training, operational unit assignments, and school assignments to sustain itself with little significant change.

The recommendations of the various panels have been captured by the staff of the Center for Army Leadership where they are responsible for tracking the implementation of solutions to the panels' recommendations.⁹⁸ Monitoring the implementation of ATLDP recommendations received high priority from the Army Chief of Staff. To support the implementation of the panel's recommendations, a council of colonels and a general officer steering committee assist the Army Chief of Staff to monitor more closely the achievements and progress.⁹⁹

In the area of leader development, the field raised the following issues:

- Personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality developmental experiences.
- Officers are concerned that the officer education system (OES) does not provide them the skills for success in full spectrum operations.¹⁰⁰

This last comment is a particularly important one. Having been trained in basic military skills and basic officership in their pre-commissioning programs, the focus for officer basic courses are the training of junior officers in the warfighting skills of their branch. However, during their first assignment with tactical units, many of these junior officers were deployed to military operations other than war, such as peacekeeping in Bosnia or Kosovo, for which they did not receive any formal training in the officer education system. Trained in detail for one set of demands, they are unprepared for the differing demands of these stressful, ambiguous missions.

⁹⁸ Interview with LTC Ray Hilliard, Center for Army Leadership, 12 April 2002.

⁹⁹ Interview, Colonel Robert Harrison, Army G-3, 19 April 2002.

¹⁰⁰ The Army Training and Leader Development Panel, *Officer Study: Report to The Army*, May 2001, Available at <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf>, Internet, accessed 1 November 2001, OS-2.

The officer study has identified significant problems that have yet to be resolved. Its efforts do have General Shinseki's attention and may support the extended analysis of expertise and jurisdiction I address in more detail later.

Officer Education System Review

Among the many initiatives General Shinseki inspired as part of the transformation campaign he launched in 1999 was one to reassess the validity and applicability of the officer education system (OES) to meet the future needs of the Army. The mission to undertake this reassessment was assigned to the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.¹⁰¹

A major initiative for the OES was General Shinseki's objective to remove the two-tiered aspect of officer mid-career education with respect to the US Army Command and General Staff College. Presently, after selection for promotion to major, Army officers are also subject to competitive selection for the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). Approximately 50% of Army Majors are selected for resident attendance. Remaining officers are required to complete a correspondence version of the course to be eligible for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.¹⁰² General Shinseki's objective was to restructure the attendance of CGSOC to remove competitive selection and require all officers to attend the resident course at Fort Leavenworth (or an approved sister service or allied equivalent school). Furthermore, recognizing the two track nature of the new OPMS XXI system, the course would be restructured into a common core

¹⁰¹ The Center for Army Leadership is part of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The Center includes an instructor division for the staff college as well as offices that work exclusively on broader leadership issues for the Army as a whole. "CAL orchestrates the development, execution, and evaluation of current and future leadership and leader development initiatives across the Army." From CAL website, <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cal/>, Internet, accessed 29 May 2002.

¹⁰² Officers must complete 50% of CGSOC to be eligible for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Must complete the course to be eligible for promotion to Colonel. DA PAM 600-3, 26.

element for all officers and an advanced operations and warfighting course (AOWC) for all officers remaining in the operational career field (OPCF).¹⁰³

A significant intellectual portion of this effort to restructure CGSOC was undertaken by a civilian contractor, CUBIC.¹⁰⁴ CUBIC conducted a comprehensive analysis of the current curriculum and structure of ILE and suggested possible courses of action for change. The main theme of the needs assessment was based on a summary of the future operational environment and the commensurate leadership demands that environment will create.

In the next half century, the operational environment will become more complex and will be significantly different than facing a single symmetrical threat from the past. The threat will be asymmetrical and multidimensional and the Army will require greater capabilities from its leaders to handle this challenge.¹⁰⁵

The analysis concludes that the current curriculum is heavily steeped in a training model based on what to think and what to know for the upcoming assignments to operational units. The CUBIC analysis recommends a much greater emphasis on analysis and synthesis to better educate leaders on *how* to think.¹⁰⁶

CUBIC is in the final stages of its review of the OES for company grade officers (Lieutenants and Captains). CUBIC owes the contracted report to the Center for Army Leadership NLT 30 June 2002.¹⁰⁷ As with the ILE study, the focus of the report will be

¹⁰³ ILE requirements for common core and AOWC contained in problem statement approved by BG David Huntoon, Deputy Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, 18 February 2001 in CUBIC Applications INC, *Intermediate Level Education Needs Analysis, Volume 1*. DABT65-98-D-0002, 30 March 2001, p. 2-3

¹⁰⁴ CUBIC provided a needs assessment of the Army's intermediate level education program and provided its results in March 2001. CUBIC conducted the assessment under government contract DABT 65-98-D-0002 24 August 2000. From CUBIC memo to LTC McCreight, 30 March 2001. CUBIC is currently finalizing the needs assessment for Army company grade (Lieutenant and Captain) officer education. The needs assessment is due to be delivered to the Army in June 2002.

¹⁰⁵ CUBIC Needs Analysis, 1-1.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 1-4

¹⁰⁷ Interview, Mr. Rob Schwartzman, 19 April 2002.

on assessment of current programs and suggested competencies and learning models for the branch basic and career courses and for the Combined Arms Service and Staff School.¹⁰⁸

Officership and the Ethic of Service

One of the most promising efforts to explicitly address the issue of officership as a profession is the work currently taking place under the auspices of the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic (SCPME). Located at the United States Military Academy, the Simon Center is leading a determined effort to develop a clear understanding of what it means to be an officer and the ethic of service that accompanies that role.

The Simon Center was created in 1998. It is a recent addition to the United States Military Academy that was created to bring together previous strands of important professional ethics represented by the West Point honor system and efforts to improve respect for others. "Academy leadership established the Center to deepen cadets' understanding of the Professional Military Ethic and better coordinate the Academy's ethical development programs across the curriculum."¹⁰⁹ The Center was also charged with responsibility to assist the broader Army to address issues of officership and professional military ethics.

With respect to this latter mission, the Simon Center has assumed the leadership in Army wide efforts to address some of the key challenges identified by the ATLDP

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. Combined Arms Service and Staff School is the same for all officers and concentrates on basic staff skills such as writing, briefing and coordination.

¹⁰⁹ Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, "History," Available from <http://www.usma.edu/cpme/welcome.htm>, Internet, accessed 31 May 2002.

study (see above). Based on recommendations from the 2001 ATLDP officer study, the Simon Center identified the following imperatives:

Imperative 1A1—Publish Definition of Army Service Ethic
Imperative 1A2—Research, Develop, and Publish Doctrine on Officership in Appropriate Leadership Doctrine.
Imperative 1A3—Teach an Army Service Ethic and Officership throughout OES from OBC to AWC with special emphasis in OBC and CCC.¹¹⁰

The Simon Center is working closely with members of Cadet Command (which administers the ROTC program), the Center for Army Leadership, and Army G3 (Operations), among others, to help operationalize programs for addressing these imperatives throughout all of the pre-commissioning programs and OES. If implemented, the improvements recommended will add greater emphasis to concept of core values of officership, the nature of the Army as a profession, and the service ethic on behalf of American society.

This is a laudable effort that also holds great promise for the future of the Army profession. To implement the initiatives suggested, the Center sponsors conferences two to three times a year that evaluate progress and make refinements to issues of professional ethics. Intended participants include representatives of the all major elements of the officer education system (pre-commissioning through War College), Army G3 (Operations), and Army G1 (personnel).¹¹¹

Assessment of Current Revitalization Efforts

There is a joke about a drunk looking for his car keys under a street lamp one night. A kind soul approached and offered to help. "Approximately where did you lose

¹¹⁰ Simon Center for The Professional Military Ethic, "Developing Officers for the Army Profession." Concept Paper contained in conference materials for 14-15 January 2002 conference.

¹¹¹ Interview with Colonel Michael Haith, 29 March 2002.

your keys?" the person asked. "Way back over there by my car," the drunk said gesturing towards a car nestled in the shadows several feet away. "Then why are you looking here?" the helper asked. "Because the light's better," came the reply.

Some of the efforts the Army has undertaken have this 'street lamp search' quality. These are the easy or clear things to do; however, they are unlikely to help solve the main problem at hand. Indeed, finding answers to some of these lower order issues will simply make it that much more difficult to fix higher order problems. Or, more likely, will simply require us to change lower order systems again once we do focus on first principles.

This study suggests a framework to place many of these efforts into better relative context. There is a lot of very useful, serious and well-intended work going on to adapt and improve various pieces of the existing Army system. Several of these efforts have provided valuable insights of the Army's challenges. Most have focused more broadly on the Army as an institution or organization without an explicit focus on the needs of the profession. A key point is that most of this effort is focused on improving pieces of the current Army organization without first assessing the underlying framework that validates the continuing existence of these pieces. For example, the question of how to improve the branch assignment and professional development systems assumes that the current branches are the ones we should have. The framework of this study suggests that we should look first at what branches are appropriate to generate and to manage the expert knowledge that we have identified for particular jurisdictions.

What is missing is a coherent, comprehensive process to integrate all of these disparate efforts. Appropriate integration will require a clear identification of priorities

of effort as well as the appropriate sequence of efforts to support effective change. For the time being, one of the key principles of the current efforts seems to accept the perpetuation of the current personnel assignment and certification process. The branch qualifying models (aside from OPMS XXI) and the assignment and promotion patterns appear to be highly stable. In fact, General Shinseki has suggested the need for greater stabilization in assignment and transition processes to prevent personal turmoil and hence improve an important quality of life aspect for service members. Instead of representing a subordinate output of professional review process, the personnel management system seems to form one of the initial constraints on other changes. I believe that this puts the bureaucratic cart before the professional horse.

This lack of focus on the profession's needs is a major flaw. It allows bureaucratic and other institutional imperatives to dominate. The most important values that define the Army are its professional values. Professional imperatives must provide the first principles of reform and transformation from which all else flows. As currently structured, this is not the case.

Reordered and integrated according to the professional framework of this study, many of the ongoing efforts hold great promise. As currently organized, there is confusion about the relative value and priority of competing efforts. Furthermore, there is a tendency to first fix those things that we can fix easiest. This tendency to pick the easiest items can cause problems if it later impedes or inhibits more important, fundamental changes. Defining the profession's expertise and the nature of individual professional expertise should come first. The expertise that generates the Army's capacity should inform the negotiation of legitimate jurisdictions for the profession. A

clear understanding of expertise and jurisdictions should then lead to the process by which professionals are developed.

A New Framework

The first part of this study laid out the general intellectual framework, some historical background, and an update on the current efforts to revitalize the Army. The remaining three chapters present the central purpose of this study—the development of a framework for prioritizing and bounding the Army profession’s expert knowledge and the appropriate jurisdictions for the Army.

The framework is the primary purpose of this study. It provides a methodology of HOW TO THINK about the issues of the Army’s professional expertise and jurisdictions. To demonstrate the utility of the framework (so I hope) I have also drawn out what I believe to be some logical implications and applications. In that regard, the application of the model and the conclusions of its application are just one possible view (mine). This step into the subjective realm of *what* to think is, I hope, provocative and maybe even controversial. Using the framework and its premises, I believe that we can open a healthy debate on what conclusions to draw. Ultimately, the strategic leaders of the profession will decide the preliminary priorities and boundaries of the profession. The strategic leaders of the profession will then represent the profession to civilian leaders, advise them on the appropriate use of the profession, and negotiate the precise jurisdictional boundaries and issues of expertise. In turn, the strategic leaders of the profession owe an explanation of these negotiations and their outcomes to the other members of the professions. It will be a continuing process.

Why map the Army’s professional expertise and jurisdictions? There are three main reasons:

1. We are in a world of constrained resources. We are required to make choices about the best ways to allocate the resources we acquire. This framework should allow strategic leaders to better articulate the profession's needs, in priority, on firm professional grounds. This approach yields important suggestions about the competing demands for constrained human resources (personnel and associated intellectual).

2. This approach can help us reestablish our sense of the Army's collective professional identity as well as the individual self-concepts of our professionals. The results of an institutional dialogue on these issues can lead us back to consensus about who we are and what role we play for society.

3. This framework can help us move beyond the nebulous concept of Full Spectrum dominance currently in vogue. The spectrum of conflict and range of military operations is vast. Society may well require the Army to participate in missions in all parts of the spectrum. We already acknowledge that fighting and winning our nation's wars the highest priority within that spectrum. Taking this "nonnegotiable contract"¹¹² as the start point, we can identify other priorities at the nexus of expert knowledge and jurisdictions of practice. We should be forthright in debating and negotiating these priorities. We owe society and the members of the profession this improved clarity as a step towards greater effectiveness.

¹¹² *FM 1, The Army*, 21.

Chapter 5: Defining the Map of Army Expert Knowledge

*The Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win our Nation's wars. Our unique contribution to national security is prompt, sustained land dominance across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict. The Army provides the land force dominance essential to shaping the international security environment.*¹¹³

FM 1: The Army, June 2001

Defining the Army Profession's Expert Knowledge

A critical task for strategic leaders of the profession is to define the map of expert knowledge. Leaders need to establish the Army's sector within the overall framework of the larger map of society's professional jurisdictions and expertise. Andrew Abbott's valuable insight in the *System of Professions* is the dynamic and interactive competition among experts to command jurisdictions of practice legitimized by society. For many professions, this legitimacy is delivered in the form of market power and consumer selection. Professions succeed or fail as they demonstrate that they have a body of abstract knowledge that can be valuably applied on behalf of its clients. The Army profession exists within a similar competitive realm. However, there is a key difference in the client structure of the Army profession. American society is the sole client of the Army. The Army's legitimacy and effectiveness are measured entirely in relation to meeting the demands of American society for common defense and security.

The key to professional health and legitimacy is the application of the profession's abstract knowledge in accepted jurisdictions. Hence, the effort to conceptualize a map of the Army's professional expertise is an effort to portray what is unique about the structure of the profession and its applicable expertise. Furthermore, professionals are

¹¹³ Department of the Army, *FM 1: The Army*, 14 June 2001, 21.

stewards of the expert knowledge and have a critical responsibility to refine and pass on expertise to other members of the profession.¹¹⁴ Table 2 below provides a general application of the principles of professional expertise for the Army Profession. There are four broad categories of expertise required by the Army:

Military-technical expertise. The Army's core expertise. "How the profession prepares for and conducts land operations combining Army soldiers with organizations, doctrine, and technology."¹¹⁵ The leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force (a replacement for Huntington's formulation of 'the management of violence'¹¹⁶). This requires the mastery and appropriate application of violent means to accomplish policy ends. This includes understanding the effects of coercive force, actual and potential, to accomplish national objectives.

Human development expertise. "The Army's management of its human resources..."¹¹⁷ and "...creating, developing, and maintaining expert knowledge, and embedding that knowledge in members of the profession."¹¹⁸ How the profession prepares people for its purposes. This expertise focuses on human resource management and human development. This expertise pertains to how to maximize the effectiveness of the people that apply the Army's core expertise. This includes leadership, physical fitness, psychological development, spiritual fitness, education, and social work. These are critical bodies of expertise that must be understood by the leaders of the Army's core units (the combat arms portions of the force). These human organizations are expert in controlled application of coercive force governed by societal needs. This also includes

¹¹⁴ Don M. Snider, *Future of the Army Profession*, Presentation to Naval War College, 22 May 2002.

¹¹⁵ Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 101.

¹¹⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.

¹¹⁷ Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 438.

professional development, that is, how to define and refine understanding of the profession's expertise and how to develop the professionals to apply that expertise. This includes high-level theoretical and basic research related to educating and training members of the profession and the understanding of expertise of other academic fields relevant to the Army for training and education (practically and pedagogically).

Political-Social expertise.

The Army profession serves its collective client, the American people, through interactions with the citizenry's elected and appointed leaders and the nation's other government agencies...today's global and national circumstances—for example, American's preeminent global role, the increased role of joint military commands and agencies, as well as that of the staffs and agencies of the Executive and Congress—demand expanded political and social literacy of Army professionals of all ranks as well as increased interactions between America's military and the larger defense community.¹¹⁹

This includes expertise to manage interaction between the Army and the broader defense community (public, industry, government). This liaison expertise focuses on the context within which military and other means are applied to achieve national objectives. This expertise permits translation—both to society and to other members of the profession—of the appropriate application of military means to society's ends. This includes the critical task of representing the profession to society and advising society on the use of the profession's expertise.¹²⁰

Ethical-Moral expertise. Professional ethics concerning the nature of professional moral duties—to members of the institution and to society. Includes issues of candor, trust, and character. “The nature of the profession is such that only moral soldiers can discharge their professional duties, and the Army's strategic leaders are morally obligated

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 355.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 197.

to the client to maintain a profession of both competence and character.”¹²¹ The critical, normative understanding of how to apply the core expertise of the profession (ethics that govern the leadership of organized coercive force). This also includes ethics that govern the appropriate relationship of the profession to its client, society (a portion of civil-military relations).

¹²⁰ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 72.

¹²¹ Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 291.

Table 2: Map of the Army Profession's Expert Knowledge

Expertise Applicability and priority →		Ia. Army Lead	Ib. Military unique	Ic. Army specific application	III. General application (needed internally)	IV. General application, (needed externally)
Character of expertise →		Core	Core	Core support	Acquired	Borrowed
How Acquired →		Army exclusive	Military exclusive	Army and Society	Contract IN	Contract OUT
Developmental responsibility →		Army	Military	Society with Army component	Society with Army quality control	Society
Certification →		Army	Military	Army	Army & Society	Society
Military Technical Expert Knowledge	Leadership of human organizations in application of coercive force	X (sustained land warfare)	X (general warfare)			
	Combat	X				
	Combat support	X				
	Joint opns		X			
	Combined opns		X			
	Admin/ Logistics			X		
	Engineering/Science			X		
	Info Technology			X		
Human Development Expert Knowledge	Leadership			X		
	Human Behavior			X		
	Physical Fitness			X		
	Education			X		
	Combat Medicine			X		
	Family Medicine				X	
	Social Work				X	
Moral-Ethical Expert Knowledge	Ethical Standards	X				
	Character development	X				
	Legal			X		
	Solider spirituality				X	
Political Social Expert Knowledge	Advice on behalf of and representation of the Profession	X				
	Political negotiation			X		
	Diplomacy (attaché)			X		
	Resource Acquisition & Management				X	
Other	Basic Research					X

NOTE: Within categories, specific areas of expert knowledge are listed in their relative priority to the Army profession.

Table 2 provides an institutional perspective on the relevant elements of the profession's expert knowledge. They are identified by their applicability to the Army's core expertise in the leadership of soldiers in organized application of coercive force, especially, sustained land warfare on behalf of the society. This is the heartland of abstract, expert knowledge to which all other expertise relates. The five columns assist in classifying and prioritizing areas of expertise relevant to the Army profession in general terms. With regard to this study, the focal point is the nature of the framework as a way to think about Army expertise. The specific placement of "X" in a particular box is a matter of debate. The depiction in table 2 is one possible view. More views would form a useful part of the professional dialogue that can lead to consensus.

I. Army lead: Expert knowledge central to the Army's jurisdictions. Army has lead, if not unique, expertise in these areas. Expertise in these areas is differentiated from other military services by the relationship to sustained land warfare. The ability to succeed in sustained land warfare is the core, immutable responsibility of the Army. The Army cannot delegate this responsibility.

Ib. Military unique: These are areas of expertise that encompass the Army and at least one other US military service (if not all services). This relates the unique expertise of the Army to the other American military services (joint operations) and American allies (combined operations) on behalf of American society.

II. Army-Specific application (societal availability): Areas of expert knowledge that have counterparts within the broader society, however, within the Army, the application of this expertise requires a key, unique adaptation. In particular, the ability to apply the expert knowledge within a combat environment or in a manner directly related

to the Army's central responsibility for sustained land warfare. For example, medicine is a body of expert knowledge required by society as a whole. The Army has a requirement for this general expertise as well as for the adaptation of this expertise to the specific demands of Army operations—especially in combat. The particular adaptation of the expertise requires additional training or schooling to adapt the knowledge to Army needs. Medicine, law, engineering, and diplomacy related specifically to Army missions, require that such expertise be adapted and specialized. Regulating the appropriate ethical and social application of such expertise within the Army's professional jurisdictions further justifies integrating such expertise and its individual experts directly into the Army. The social control inherent in Army professional standards and certification must be extended to the practitioners of such supporting expertise.

III. General Application (needed internally). These are areas of expertise for which society and the military's application of the expert knowledge are the same. The key distinction is that the Army, as an institution, has regular need of this expertise and therefore needs to have readily available, individuals who can apply this knowledge on behalf of the Army's interests. To the degree that extensive familiarity with the Army and its operations, norms and values is important in the appropriate exercise of this expertise on the Army's behalf, individual experts in these areas may be developed within the ranks of the profession. To the degree that such familiarity is less crucial; experts in these categories can be hired from civilian society to apply the expertise on behalf of the Army. More likely, the exercise of expertise in these areas will involve a combination of Army members uniquely qualified to bridge the gap between the Army and the broader society in these areas of expertise. Expertise in these areas is probably

best understood as liaison expertise where individual experts provide the crucial capacity to translate an area of general expertise to Army purposes. Non-Army experts in these areas are contracted into the organization.

IV. General Applications (needed externally). The last column simply reflects the idea that there are areas of expertise in society that may be borrowed and applied by non-Army professionals as the need arises and without the more demanding social and ethical controls created by integrating such practitioners directly into the Army. There is expertise that is just as applicable inside or outside the military for which no particular adaptation is required. If expertise is available to be borrowed, there is no need to integrate it internally. Such experts can be contracted out.

The last two columns are very similar. If practitioners in these areas of expertise must be readily available within combat zones, there are good reasons for the Army to exercise horizontal integration to include this expertise within the organization. These are items in the fourth column. The last column includes expertise in the broader society that the Army can simply acquire the products of this expertise as needed. This would also hold for the use of expertise in infrequent or highly episodic instances. The expertise may indeed be very useful to the Army, but its constant availability within the profession is unnecessary to meet professional needs or is simply inefficient given other sources of the expertise that society produces. There is a presumption that the expertise will be readily available when the Army needs it.

Other relevant aspects of expertise include where the expertise is applied, where it should be acquired, and how it is applied.

Where applied? If in a combat zone, expectation of being affected by violence is a key consideration (e.g., medics, chaplains, drivers, pilots). If the expertise doesn't need to be applied in a combat zone, then, there may be no need for it inside the Army. Expertise in Army exclusive/lead areas are ones for which there is no expectation for society more broadly to create or use. These are areas where the military has the lead and must be able to articulate needs and provide for them regardless of anything else society does.

Where acquired? That is, who controls the life cycle of expertise development and improvement (responsible for development and educational advancement)? For Army lead/dominant expertise, Army should be responsible for the entire life cycle of expertise development and application. For expertise created elsewhere in society but with specific Army applications, the Army is responsible for Army specific aspects of the expertise. For expertise with general applications in society, the Army can leave training and development to others but must ensure quality control of its application to Army purposes. Elements of expertise that have army specific applications imply that there is related expertise that is generated by society as a whole but which requires adaptation to make it militarily effective. Civilian/societal sources are useful, but there is a component of specific Army application that must be developed and sustained by the Army itself. Law, medicine, logistics, and religion are good examples of this.

How applied? Is there a particular ethical or moral element peculiar to its Army application (life or death impact)? This implies an important component of ethical management and control that may differ from society more generally. A good example

would be application of information technology as a form of warfare (to hurt, kill or disable others through effects on national infrastructure or other public goods).

Defining the Expert Knowledge of Individual Professionals

*The quality, maturity, experience, and intellectual development of Army leaders and Soldiers become even more critical in handling the broader range of simultaneous missions in this complex [future] operational environment.*¹²²

U.S. Army Objective Force White Paper 2001

The first part of this chapter explained a framework for understanding the areas of expert knowledge required by the Army at an institutional level. The combination of numerous professionals with diverse paths of development and integration provide the aggregate pool of expertise to serve the profession. The next step is to suggest a map of the expertise of individual Army professionals.

The Superintendent of the United States Military Academy noted that future challenges will place high demands on new officers.

Officers of the 21st Century must be flexible, principled, and self-learning. These officers will be challenged to lead American soldiers and make complex decisions in complicated environments with little or no time. They will be part Harvard professor, part professional athlete, part Ambassador, and all disciplined warfighter. It will take each one of these attributes to be successful on the 21st Century battlefield.¹²³

This is a tall order for each individual officer. As the previous section suggested, the Army as a professional institution does need the expertise of professors, athletes, ambassadors, and warfighters. The degree to which each individual professional must possess this expertise is an important consideration. In this section, I provide a suggested framework to consider the categories of professional expertise appropriate to generalists

¹²² U.S. Army, *Concepts for the Objective Force*. United States Army White Paper. Undated, 3.


¹²³ William J. Lennox Jr. (Lieutenant General, USMA Superintendent), "The Supe's Letter: A Soldier of the 21st Century." *Assembly LX*, no. 4 (March/April 2002), 8.

at the core of the profession as well for specialists who will continue to serve the profession by more closely approximating the high level expertise in a particular field akin to the Harvard professors, professional athletes, ambassadors and warfighters of General Lennox's ideal.

This section suggests a framework to understand the appropriate relationship of the profession's general requirements and the manner in which individuals develop expertise to meet the profession's overall demands. It is a simple recognition that the members of the profession cannot all be masters of every area of expert knowledge required by the Army as an institution.

The Army seeks to create generalists *familiar* with many or all of the major aspects of the profession's expertise and the appropriate use of such expertise in complementary, synergistic combination within the force structure. These generalists are the core from which we obtain the strategic leaders of the profession. Complementing these generalists are the specialists who master areas of knowledge that support the Army's success in its core expertise.

Figure 1 is the current life cycle model for basic branch commissioned officers. It reflects a dual track emphasis on branch and functional area assignments supported by periodic military school experiences.



In the section that follows, tables 3, 4, and 5 sketch out a general map of individual professional expertise. Using current assignment patterns, branches, and functional areas, these tables overlay with suggestive connections and relationships to the four broad categories of professional expertise described in the previous section.

¹²⁴ Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1 October 1998, 15.

Table 3: Suggested Army Officer Professional Development pattern: Operations Career Field (basic branches ^{note 1})

Level of War focus	Rank	School or Key assignment	Area of Expert Knowledge ^{note 2}			
			Military-Technical	Human-Development	Ethical-Moral	Personal
Tactical	Strategic	GO				
		GO				
		GO				
	Operational	GO	Capstone			
		COL				
		LTC	War College (JPME)			
		LTC				
		LTC				
		LTC/MAJ				
		MAJ				
		MAJ	CGSC/AWOC			
		Career Field Designation (non-OPCF specialization) SEE TABLE 5				
		MAJ/CPT				
		CPT				
		CPT	Army CAS3			
		CPT	Branch CCC			
		LT				
		LT	Branch OBC			
		LT	Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC)			
		Cadet	Undergraduate education			
		Cadet				

NOTES:

1. Basic Army Branches are¹²⁵:

Combat Arms	Combat Support	Combat Service Support
11 Infantry	25 Signal Corps	42 Adjutant General
12 Armor	31 Military Police	44 Finance
13 Field Artillery	35 Military Intelligence	88 Transportation
14 Air Defense Artillery	74 Chemical	91 Ordnance
15 Aviation		92 Quartermaster
18 Special Forces		
21 Engineers		

2. Relative size of particular category bar on a particular line (assignment or school) is merely suggestive, not definitive. They reflect my subjective assessment of relative applicability.

3. MAJ/CPT nominative assignments: Relative weight of areas of expertise will vary depending on the nature of the assignment. Likely to be highly specialized within a particular category of expertise (e.g., professor at USMA, Branch school instructor, CTC observer/controller, Active Component/Reserve Component [AC/RC] unit advisor)

¹²⁵ DA Pam 600-3, Paragraph 8-2c, 31.

Table 3 suggests the following general points concerning expertise:

- Three milestones in professional education are used to maintain professional balance across the categories of expertise over time. The pre-commissioning program (college or USMA), Intermediate Level Education (CGSOC or equivalent) and Senior Service College (Army War College or equivalent) should serve to ensure that officers maintain appropriate professional bearings across all four categories as they progress through their careers.
- With respect to the education system, the programs in company grade (LT and CPT) schools (basic officer leadership course, branch officer basic course, branch captain's career course, and combined arms service and staff school) should be weighted to focus on military-technical and human development expertise that are most important to leadership at the tactical level. Familiarity with specialized branch capabilities and functions should be embedded within a broad familiarity with the Army's combined arms concept. For officers, the narrow branch specialty expertise is most valuable to the degree that it contributes to enlightened integration into the Army's combined arms operations. Combined arms operations are the focal point of tactical operations in the same manner that joint (multiservice) operations are the focal point of operational and strategic missions. This general, integrative competence represents a key distinction between commissioned officers and the more technically specialized warrant officers and non-commissioned officers of the branches.

- Assignments will vary considerably in the degree to which they demand application of expertise from each category.
 - MILITARY-TECHNICAL: In general, lower ranking, tactical assignments require greater emphasis on military-technical expertise.
 - HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: Operational assignments with troop units (staff or command) demand generally higher levels of human development expertise (leadership and physical fitness). Demands for leadership expertise and physical development peak for Battalion and Brigade command. These commands are also critical as part of strategic leadership of the Army profession: These tactical commanders have great influence on the professional development and mentoring of rising professionals and the daily organizational culture of the Army.¹²⁶
 - POLITICAL-SOCIAL: Higher-level positions require greater political-social expertise. This is true in order to deal with members of other services and civilians. The dominant characteristic of this expertise is its liaison function with other professions and external actors. This is also the instrumental expertise that largely governs the competition to define or refine legitimate professional expertise and jurisdictions. This includes an emphasis on the maintenance of appropriate civil-military relations in accordance with Constitutional norms.
 - ETHICAL-MORAL: Always important to sustain Army professional values. The importance of expertise in this category increases with rank

and responsibility. This is relevant to officers in their roles as exemplars for the profession, particularly as leaders with considerable power over other people (e.g., with regard to command and its legal responsibilities).

Principles of Army Education

The ambiguous nature of the operational environment requires Army leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self-aware leaders understand their operational environment, can assess their own capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses, and actively learn to overcome their weaknesses. Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.¹²⁷

The nature of the duties performed reflects the mixture of a variety of skills and knowledge that changes in relative combination over time. For example, the concept of the 'strategic corporal' or 'strategic lieutenant' acknowledges that the actions of even low ranking members of the Army can have important effects based on the actions they take or fail to take. It behooves the Army to have these lower level leaders familiar with the larger context within which their missions are performed. Nonetheless, the dominant challenges and demands on these junior leaders are more likely to be of tactical or local significance. The overwhelming focus of education and training for these junior members of the profession are the technical and tactical tasks that dominate their level. We should nevertheless ensure that they are familiar with the less likely but potentially more dangerous higher-level elements of operational and strategic importance.

Over the course of a career, the balance of focus will move away from the tactical and technical aspects of the profession to the broader operational and strategic realms of

¹²⁶ For development of this argument in greater detail, see Gregg F. Martin and Jeffrey D. McCausland, "The Role of Strategic Leaders for the Future Army Profession," Chapter 20 in Snider & Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 425-438.

the profession (to include joint and national security professionalism). In other words, at any particular level of development, there are aspects of tactical, operational, and strategic knowledge that are important. The emphasis on a particular aspect shifts over time. The nature of school progression and assignment patterns should reflect this shift over time.

Initially, all officers receive a very broad familiarity with all three levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic) across all components of Army expertise. Demonstrated prowess in particular skills should be a factor in governing placement within particular specialties of the Army profession (that is the particular branches of service). All officers must meet minimal standards. Officers that excel in particular skills should initially be matched as well as possible against the specialties to dominate Army professional development at the tactical level (currently the first 8-10 years of an Army officer's career).

The training and assignment experiences of these first 10 years, under today's construct, are focused on the individual service branches and their branch schools. This focus on the military-technical demands, particularly with their very high emphasis on branch specific, tactics, and complex warfighting tasks defines the perspective and evaluation criteria of junior Army professionals.

These short-term career and functional imperatives are likely sources of the dissonance and tension related to missions other than war. Although strategic leaders have embraced and understand the broader implications of full-spectrum dominance, the implications are at odds with the warfighting focus of junior officers. Battalion and brigade commanders play a crucial role in the strategic leadership of the profession in

¹²⁷ Department of the Army, *FM 1: The Army*, 14 June 2001, 12.

helping to bridge this narrower tactical understanding of the profession with broader professional jurisdictions and responsibilities.¹²⁸ To do this effectively, the political-social context must remain part of the professional development process at all levels. It is not a perspective that should be deferred until an officer is ready to join the ranks of the senior, strategic leadership (generally provided at the War College). The detailed study, education and refinement of this perspective is certainly an appropriate priority among those war college students who provide the pool from which senior leaders will be selected. It is also worth additional emphasis during the capstone course provided to those selected for flag rank. But the profession needs *all* members to be familiar with this larger context at every level.

During pre-commissioning, this suggests an academic familiarity with the processes of domestic and international political relations that frame the larger environment within which the Army operates. This perspective should be reinforced in the officer education with attention to the manner in which this environment affects their military specialty as it supports broader combined arms, joint and combined arms operations in support of national security policy. All Army officers should have the ability to answer basic questions from their soldiers concerning why a unit is conducting a particular mission. "Lieutenant, what are we doing in Bosnia?" Any officer should have the ability to answer this or similar questions from their soldiers with an explanation of the social-political context that underlies the Army's service to the nation. The ability to recognize and understand the processes by which the Army receives its missions requires a fundamental understanding of American civil-military relations. Moreover, answering such a question does not and should not require a normative judgment of the

¹²⁸ Martin and McCausland, 436.

policy. Officers must understand the mechanisms that translate national decisions into individual unit actions. Judgment on the wisdom or appropriateness of such policy decisions, is not, however, a legitimate topic for professional comment. This last point is one of professional ethics and nuance that requires Army professionals to separate themselves from some of the normal prerogatives of citizenship (e.g., partisan free speech).

The schools and assignment process must be designed to nurture these traits over time so that we have created the foundation for professional expertise at higher levels rather than have to try to create the capacity all at once. Furthermore, this familiarity with the higher level concepts among junior members of the profession ensures that they are more familiar with the context of decisions and guidance from above that are influenced by these concepts (keep the troops informed to so that it minimizes uncertainty and dissonance).

The Officer Education System (OES) should be designed with a near-term and long-term perspective. The near-term elements concentrate on training for the challenges and tasks most likely to be encountered at the subsequent level of service (e.g., tactical, branch oriented focus for OBC and CCC; brigade and higher level command and staff for CGSC). Long-term elements should account for the strategic interests of the profession. These elements of the curriculum must emphasize education and analysis across all the components of Army expertise (military-technical, ethical-moral, political-social and human development). Education must assist officers to understand the contours of the fields of knowledge associated with each expertise. This also updates previous exposure to these fields and helps guide continued development inside and outside the classroom.

The relative demand for education versus training should increase within the OES as officers rise in rank and experience. Mastery of specific skills and tasks should give way to broader theoretical and conceptual training. This is a means to greater flexibility, versatility, psychological maturity and mental agility. This is also corresponds to the higher levels of uncertainty and greater opportunities for choice that accompany promotion and commensurately higher professional responsibilities.

Pre-commissioning must address all elements of the Army's expertise and jurisdiction as candidly as possible with rising officers. Newly commissioned officers must start from a 'full-spectrum' background. Between the pre-commissioning and BOLC programs, all officers should have the same foundations of Army professional ethics, understanding of officership (to include an officer's role of servant to American society) and the intellectual training of a broad but balanced technical/scientific and humanities education.

Pre-commissioning standards provide the uniform preparation of all officers. The expectation is that all have met minimal standards of education and discipline. That they have faced and exceeded standards designed to ensure, as best possible, that the certified (commissioned) candidates have the potential to perform their duties in a professionally responsible manner. Emphasis on pre-commissioning is for all officers to have the same fundamentals of professional education and familiarity with broader areas of professional expertise (military-technical, social-political, moral-ethical, human development). The seeds of all future strategic leaders are part of this broad population. To the extent that an element of professional expertise required in strategic leaders must be developed and grown throughout an entire career, it must be present at the beginning. Table 4 presents a

standardized pre-commissioning template that should govern all officer accessions. The primary model for this template is the program of the United States Military Academy. Within each category of expertise, core military programs and supporting academic programs are designed to work in tandem. The academic program provides theoretical education and a broader context for the areas of expertise appropriate for the Army profession. The core military program reinforces these elements with Army or military specific academic courses, practical army experience and rigorous army training. Fundamentally however, the importance of success in this comprehensive program of both abstract education and practical experience is the ability of the profession to certify that its new members have the acceptable foundation upon which to build over a career of service to the nation. Although the relative value of various aspects will change over the course of a typical career, the functional imperatives of the profession require that commissioned professionals have the familiarity and mental agility to recognize the problems at hand and draw on a complex body of abstract knowledge to suggest appropriate diagnoses, inference and treatment.

As noted, this table is based on the current West Point model. This program should be standardized across all pre-commissioning sources. The intent is not to set West Point aside as the one, optimized source for Army professionals. The issue is to identify the appropriate rationale for the elements of the program and create the mechanisms to establish these standards as uniformly as possible across all commissioning sources. Large portions of the military program are already incorporated

in the campus ROTC programs and officer candidate schools.¹²⁹ Less consistent are the academic requirements to support Army professional expertise. The requirement for a bachelor's degree is deemed sufficient to provide professional academic qualification from ROTC programs. For OCS, a bachelor's degree is not required for commissioning. Officer must complete their bachelor's degree before attending a Captain's Career Course (approximately three years of commissioned service).¹³⁰ The specific components of the academic program are at the discretion of the individual.¹³¹

Table 4: Pre-Commissioning Map of Army Professional Expertise (USMA, OCS, ROTC, Direct commission)¹³²

Area	Military-Technical		Human Development	
	Core Military	Supporting	Core Military	Supporting
Examples	Basic Training (Weapons, common Tasks) Field Training Small unit operations	Science (physics, chemistry) Math Engineering Information technology	Leadership Physical fitness Discipline	Psychology Physiology

Area	Ethical-Moral		Social-Political	
	Core Military	Supporting	Core Military	Supporting
Examples	Law of War Just war Professional ethics Army values Officership UCMJ	Philosophy English Law (constitutional & criminal)	Military History Civil-military relations	US History American Politics International Relations Economics Language

¹²⁹ For a detailed list of the common core tasks for the OES system at the company grade and pre-commissioning level, see <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/cal/LETDD/COMMON1.htm>, Internet, accessed 30 May 2002.

¹³⁰ DA Pam 600-3, Paragraph 4-16b, 19.

¹³¹ The AR does require that ROTC scholarship candidates have an approved major. However, the list of approved majors is extremely comprehensive and appears to suggest very little restriction on acceptable academic programs. The only specific requirement listed in the AR is for one semester of language.

¹³² The academic and military program components represented on this chart are largely parallel to the current core curriculum and military program at the United States Military Academy. See West Point 2001-2002 catalog, "It's Still About Leadership."

As table 3 suggests, the assignment patterns of officers start with a strong emphasis on military-technical expertise, particularly branch expertise. Additionally, at the lower, tactical levels of the military hierarchy, there is a high premium on the human development aspects of leadership and physical fitness. This is the level at which the greatest physical labor occurs and where the dangers of combat are the greatest.

To this point, the focus has been on the framework to develop general expertise in professionals. Implicit is the acceptance of sequential development of Army professional in the core military-technical category represented by combat arms and combat support arms. These generalists will produce the aptly named general officers.

The body of relevant knowledge that affects the Army's ability to function effectively has increased dramatically over time. Masters of particular fields require specialization and long-term experience. Table 5 illustrates specialties currently identified by the Army as they relate to the categories of Army expertise.

Table 5 Non-Operations Career Field (OPCF) Specialization




Table 5 depicts several important concepts. First is that all Army professionals come into the profession through the box in the lower left hand corner. That is the area representing the operational force (combat and combat support). In terms of pre-commissioning programs, this is the primary focus of the USMA and ROTC programs—producing professional leaders for Army operational forces. Medical, legal and religious experts are acquired from the appropriate professional education systems. Minor additional orientation or training occurs to integrate these non-Army professionals into the institution.

The arrows with their origins in the lower left hand corner box represent the OPMS XXI specialization tracks that rely on officers who have developed strong understanding and experience in the operational force.

Last, the table acknowledges that within some of the specialties, there are specialists in the civilian world whose expertise can serve the Army's needs. Specialties that are not unique to the Army *do* lend themselves to lateral entry by specialists from society who do not have previous Army experience. Examples include civilian professors at USMA, public affairs experts, comptrollers, systems analysts, etc. The argument for using officers with significant Army experience in the combat and combat support arms in these specialties would seem to rest heavily on the degree to which such experience is necessary to help integrate this knowledge to better serve the specific requirements of the Army profession. Using Academy professors as an example, arguments for training and using members of the Army profession for these tasks include the importance of using role models with substantial experience in the Army's core expertise to guide the education of aspiring professionals. The Army professors also

provide this understanding of the Army's core expertise to inform the appropriate integration of supporting expertise by civilians. Particularly with respect to specialties intimately involved with developing rising professionals, the element of control and certification of professional fitness should be kept within the profession. In pressing to gain the capacity to train officers to be strategists, Admiral Stansfield Turner noted, "I am persuaded that we can be a profession only as long as we ourselves are pushing the frontiers of knowledge in our field."¹³³ The logic should guide Army leaders as they decide which areas of general expertise warrant any control in its application to Army needs.

Map of Professional Expertise: Practical Implications and Applications

The previous sections have mapped out a framework for considering the current structure of the officer corps and the nature of the expertise they possess individually and collectively to serve the profession. In an institution as large as the United States Army, there are many demands. There are many skills and areas of expertise that it is useful for the organization to have readily available. What is important, however, is to ensure that horizontal integration to facilitate acquisition and control of particular expertise does not blur focus on the priority expertise of the profession.

The priority expertise of the Army profession is the human dimension of leadership. The Army is most importantly about its people and their ability to apply their skills in a potentially violent environment to serve American society. The abstract knowledge of leadership, particularly for combat, therefore must dominate the Army's professional essence.

¹³³ Admiral Stansfield Turner speaking in 1972, quoted in John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III and John R. Wadleigh. *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College*. Newport,

Technology provides the material tools these human organizations employ. Technology should not be confused with the skill in application that generates military effectiveness in pursuit of appropriate, societal-mandated goals.

Knowledge of technology, military doctrine, human development, professional ethics, and political-social context all support the quintessential focus on the leadership of human organizations to achieve appropriate military effects.

I believe that the focus of the profession on the leadership of soldiers in the organized application of coercive force suggests a few important ways to rethink the structure and composition of the officer corps. This includes:

Realignment of the Army basic branches for officers to eliminate combat service support branches. These branches have no peculiar or unique skill related to leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force. Instead, these skills can be provided through functional area specialization and civilian contracts at higher level. Within tactical units, combat service support task execution can be allocated to Warrant Officers and NCOs. Service support elements should be integrated into existing combat and combat support units. Remaining command and staff assignments reallocated to combat and combat support officers (for example, a tactical forward support battalion (FSB) would be commanded by a combat arms or combat support leader). The relevant experience is Army leadership, not technical specialization. Practical result: elimination of finance corps, adjutant general corps, quartermaster corps, transportation corps, and ordnance corps as officer accession branches.

Realignment of pre-commissioning system. Better distinguish between officer candidates for the operational force (basic branches) and candidates for the special

branches (medical, legal, chaplain, etc).¹³⁴ USMA, ROTC, and OCS officers for the operational force all should have the same educational foundations. This includes a common core military program and core academic requirements. Eligibility for accession to combat and combat support branches should require *certified* completion of the military core program and a baccalaureate degree that includes Army specified core elements (in other words, a baccalaureate degree per se would be insufficient for basic branch accession; composition of the academic program must include Army-specified elements).¹³⁵ Conversely, Army sponsored programs so designed and sponsored (USMA, ROTC scholarships) should require accession to basic branches (combat and combat arms). Transfer to special branches (medical, legal, religious) should be permitted only after the initial service obligation has been met.¹³⁶

Quality not Quantity. Don't let numbers drive necessity. If we know what the appropriate qualifications for a particular job are, then we should stick to our guns and alter the inducement criteria or something else, but, if we are going to accept unqualified or less qualified individuals to fill the slots, then we should have a clear decrement set of criteria and a clear system for replacing someone in a decremented position if someone better qualified becomes available. This is no different than accepting that positions are

¹³⁴ The special branches are the Judge Advocate General's Corps (legal), Chaplain corps (religious), and Medical Corps. Medical corps includes the following six sub elements: medical corps, dental corps, veterinary corps, Army Medical Specialists, Army Nurse Corps, and Medical Service Corps. *DA Pam 600-3*, Paragraph 8-2c, 31.

¹³⁵ Individual universities and colleges determine the requirements for awarding baccalaureate degrees. Army specifies academic pre-requisites for commissioning. A bachelor's degree, other than those conferred by the Military Academy, therefore not automatically sufficient for basic branch commissioning.

¹³⁶ Service obligations are as follows. Military Academy graduates are obligated for eight years of service, five of which, at a minimum must be served on active duty. ROTC scholarship recipients incur an eight-year service obligation of which four must be on active duty and the remaining four to six years in the reserves or National Guard (ROTC information from United States Army Cadet Command Headquarters, available from <http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/scholarships/green/obligation.asp>, Internet, accessed 30 May 2002.) OCS commissioned officers have a three-year active duty service obligation. Date from

coded for individuals of a certain rank and seniority and although they may be temporarily filled by a less senior individual, the assignment is contingent.

A better understanding of psychological development models also lets us see that there are stages of development better suited for particular positions.¹³⁷ To identify the position of a particular individual at a particular point in their life is difficult but not impossible. The ability to measure and code a person's stage of psychological maturity would require substantially different evaluation tools, but it can be done. In many ways, we've known what right looks like and pick the Sam Damon's out from the Courtney Massengills,¹³⁸ but there is still ample room for cynical and manipulative individuals to game the system and network in ways that avoid the cultural strictures.

Similarly, we know the physiological demands of various assignments and the expected physical demands to which the individuals will be subjected. We know the routine as well as the extraordinary demands of particular situations. The physical fitness tests can be better tailored to reflect the needs of particular specialties and provide a standard that transcends charges of political correctness and establishes truly objective standards of fitness. A minimal level of fitness for all soldiers makes sense in the same way the various physical disabilities and mental deficiencies form minimal standards for entry. However, there is nothing that prevents us from establishing specialty related standards in physical fitness, mental acuity, and psychological development as we have applied standards such as GT scores. Also in parallel to GT scores, there is nothing that precludes personal improvement or development over time. Just as improvement

Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 350-100: Officer Active Duty Service Obligations*, 4 May 2001, 5.

¹³⁷ Forsythe et al, in Snider and Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession*.

¹³⁸ Characters in the book, *Once an Eagle*, by Anton Meyer.

programs and reevaluation are available to raise GT scores, so should a system of improvement and reevaluation allow soldiers to qualify for other specialties. But this should not be merely a one-way street. If the standards for entering a particular specialty are meaningful, they must also be subject to revalidation at periodic reviews that can result in removal.

The ability to analyze and establish such standards in a coherent, consistent way demands that the expertise in the underlying fields must be resident within the Army profession in the capabilities of individuals who understand the demands of the Army's missions. Furthermore, such experience is crucial to be able to evaluate the shift in nature of the Army's jurisdiction and expertise and relate them back to their specialty.

Contracting. The identification of the core areas of knowledge carries two main implications. The first is that the profession must sustain high levels of expertise within these areas. This includes direct control of the manner in which the expertise is acquired. Emphasis on the management of the individuals with this core expertise as the highest personnel priority. Second is that the non-core jurisdictions are the ones where the Army can afford to make trade-offs in favor of efficiency. The level of Army professional expertise required is less, and the opportunity for occupational tasks to be developed and applied by non-professionals or by members of other professions is good.

Based on these principles, what can be contracted out? Broad categories of jobs that can be reasonably contracted out include:

--Jobs related to the functioning and management of military garrisons. This includes the maintenance and upkeep of facilities, support for deployment activities, and support for the military and their family members (especially to facilitate deployment of

military members). Minimal rear detachment duties can be provided by tactical units or from temporarily non-deployable military members.

--Administrative support to tactical units that does not need to deploy within a combat zone (e.g., all finance activities, large portions of administrative personnel management, and most service support).

--Higher echelon maintenance and logistics systems, particularly above theater level. This is largely already true as part of the depot maintenance system.

Chapter 6: Defining the Army's Professional Jurisdictions

The core of the Army's map of expert knowledge is the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization, a profession, whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people incident to sustaining America's dominance in land warfare. The jurisdictions within which this expertise applies are conventional war, unconventional war, military operations other than war, and homeland security. These jurisdictions describe the realms within which the Army has historically been directed to operate on behalf of society. They reflect the current and recent realms within which the Army operates. Accepting these four jurisdictions as ones of continuing relevance, this chapter briefly analyzes each jurisdiction using a framework based on Abbott's description of possible jurisdictional claim settlements.¹³⁹

This map of Army expertise suggests guidance on how to clarify appropriate jurisdictions based on the expertise of the profession to operate within these jurisdictions. Understanding the expertise of the profession and its applicability within particular jurisdictions helps identify the points for liaison and coordination with other agencies. Strategic leaders must know where the boundaries are, know when the boundaries can be appropriately crossed, and know the conditions for returning to original boundaries. This can include clarity concerning potential shifts of jurisdictional boundaries.

The external jurisdictions distinguish the problems or challenges of American society (the Army's client) to which the Army's expertise is expected to apply effectively.

¹³⁹ The detailed discussion of claim settlements can be found in Abbott, *The System of Professions*, 69-79.

Table 6: Jurisdictions and Army Settlement Claims

Jurisdiction	Settlement Claim
Conventional War	
Land War	FULL
Joint Warfare	DIVIDED
Combined Warfare	DIVIDED
Unconventional War	
Low intensity conflict/guerrilla warfare	DIVIDED
Nuclear War	ADVISORY
Military Operations Other Than War	
Peace Enforcement (ground forces).....	FULL
Peacekeeping	DIVIDED
Humanitarian Assistance	SUBORDINATE
Disaster Relief/assistance	SUBORDINATE
Military to Military contact (with foreign ground forces).....	FULL
Homeland Security	
WMD response (chemical, bio, nuke protection)	INTELLECTUAL
Law enforcement support	SUBORDINATE

The most important jurisdictions are those for which the Army has full and complete jurisdiction (FULL) and those jurisdictions that the Army shares (DIVIDED) with the other military services as part of the division of labor¹⁴⁰ of leadership of legitimate, coercive force on the nation's behalf. The other three forms of settlement (intellectual, advisory or subordinate) reflect lower priority jurisdictions relative to the profession's expertise. In descending order of priority, INTELLECTUAL jurisdiction is with "...the dominant profession retaining only cognitive control of the jurisdiction, while allowing practical jurisdiction to be shared more widely."¹⁴¹ Another settlement is to "...allow one profession an ADVISORY control over certain aspects of the work."¹⁴² Last is the concept of SUBORDINATION. In this settlement another profession (or professions) retains primary responsibility for the particular jurisdiction. The Army may have skills that are applicable within the jurisdiction, but concedes that other professions

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. 69.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid, my emphasis.

or agencies control the jurisdiction. In this settlement, the Army's role is to assist other experts.¹⁴³

Clearly the most important reason to have an Army is to support national security, and, in particular, to defend against armed forces—irregular, uniformed, foreign or domestic that threaten the security of the nation and its citizens. But the utility and value has generally been understood in a much broader context than merely preparation for war. Hence, going back to the earliest concept of the Army's utility to the nation is another way to understand the Army's most broadly defined role. "Essentially, the Army as a profession emerged to embrace any tasks levied by the American people that necessitated the deployment of trained, disciplined, manpower under austere conditions on behalf of the nation."¹⁴⁴ This broader conception of the utility of the Army beyond war accounts for the extensive involvement of the Army in nation-building tasks at home and abroad. This includes exploration of the continent (Lewis and Clark), development of vast civil engineering works (led by graduates of the country's first engineering school—West Point),¹⁴⁵ occupation and pacification of new territories (the many conflicts with native Americans throughout the continent) as well as occupation and administration of territories abroad (such as Mexico, Cuba, the Philippines, Germany after both World Wars and Japan after the second World War to name but a few).

The most important jurisdiction of the military professions is war. Within war (conventional and unconventional) professional expertise is the leadership of human

¹⁴³ Ibid, 71-72.

¹⁴⁴ Leonard Wong and Douglas V Johnson II, "Serving the American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession," in Snider and Watkins, eds., *The Future of the Army Profession*, McGraw-Hill Primus Custom Publishers, 2002, 62.

¹⁴⁵ One of the best single examples of the Army's contribution to valuable national engineering efforts was the Construction of the Panama Canal under the leadership of Colonel George Washington Goethals, West Point class of 1880.

groups in the organized application of coercive force. The jurisdictions are led, if not monopolized, by the military services. Leadership and control of organized violence in combat on behalf of the state is the special expertise of military professionals. They may be experts in many other facets of knowledge, but the management of violence is the body of abstract expertise for which society entrusts military professionals to define, develop and apply. Within the military, the Army is relied upon to define, develop and apply expertise to the leadership of coercive force incident to combat on land.¹⁴⁶ The increasingly intertwined effects of military operations on land, in the air, at sea, in space, and, according to many, in cyberspace preclude clear distinctions between the domains of combat within which the military services specialize. The overlap and interplay of capabilities optimizes for air, sea and land operations permit application in the jurisdiction of other services, albeit it with varied degrees of efficiency. This situation makes interservice competition possible. This competition provides a healthy pluralism with regard to diagnoses and treatment for national ills very similar to the healthy manner in which the United States' broad pluralistic political society provides a messy, but ultimately very successful mechanism for identifying, debating and deciding issues to the benefit of the society as a whole. In the historical aggregate, the success of the United States generally, and the success of the military more specifically, owe much to the adaptive and equilibrating mechanisms of pluralistic competition subordinated to constitutional processes, hence, to the consent of the governed.

For military operations other than war, the unique tasks for which the military is well suited are those that require the use or possible use of coercive force. The Army should retain full jurisdiction for such missions. Created for organized violence on behalf

¹⁴⁶ Title 10, United States Code Subtitle B, Part I, Chapter 307, Sec. 3062 (b).

of the state, the Army has broad capability to impose its will upon adversaries. Its ability to impose its will through the actual or potential use of violence is central to missions from wars to peacekeeping operations. In all such operations, threats include the presence of armed groups—actual or potential—organized formally (like a national army) or informally (like a terrorist network).

The Army is configured and trained to deter or defeat symmetric threats from other organized military forces. With regard to peacekeeping, it provides a capacity for escalation dominance over paramilitary, unconventional, or guerrilla forces. Although duties may include actions similar to domestic policing activities, the situations are ones that could rapidly escalate to armed clashes. Where traditional peacekeepers or police might be rapidly overwhelmed, combat-organized army forces can provide overmatch capabilities and the potential for escalation dominance to deter threats or defeat opponents if necessary.

With regard to peacekeeping missions, military-to-military contacts, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and other non-warfighting missions, there is a strong case for the employment of the readily available and robust capabilities of the Army to undertake missions that other agencies of the U.S. government or private organizations are unable to accomplish. For some missions, such as humanitarian assistance, the issue is not unique capabilities of the Army to perform needed tasks, but rather the speed with which the Army can respond and the ability to undertake such tasks in an austere, remote or unsecure environment. In these situations, the unique capacity is one of rapid response. The capacity to support such missions is a subsidiary but inherent part of the warfighting capacity of the standing force. The cost of maintaining standing

forces against low probability and unclear risks of war are thereby offset in part by utility in more likely but less threatening peacetime scenarios. In these situations, the use of military forces based on rapid reaction should be clearly recognized. The jurisdiction of the Army in performing such missions is *subordinate* or *advisory* and must therefore be clearly understood as a matter of short-term expedience. The necessary consequent link is that other government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private organizations must assume long term responsibility for these tasks as soon as possible.

Use of the Army in times of domestic natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods and wild fires is a relatively uncontroversial example of the use of armed forces in this instrumental context. Leaders understand that the use of the armed forces is for a short duration until the crisis is past and the civilian agencies can resume responsibility. It is also understood that in the event of a military emergency, armed forces would be removed from such humanitarian missions and immediately redeployed for combat operations (a mission for which only the military is responsible). There are parallels to domestic disasters in a variety of international humanitarian missions the United States armed forces have supported since the end of the Cold War. Floods in Bangladesh and Hurricane Mitch in Central America are examples of use of military skills to provide short-term crisis support after a disaster. The applicability of the armed forces to such missions should be readily apparent. Armed forces are prepared for the exigencies of war to include attacks and destruction of parts of the organization in combat. Hence, military units are capable of rapidly creating or recreating infrastructure and support mechanisms. This is a task for which Army units are well designed and very capable. These are services outside of the Army's appropriate jurisdiction. The Army should not seek to be

the experts in non-combat related disaster relief or to supplant civilian governmental and non-governmental agencies in the management of disaster relief. It should suffice for the Army to be prepared to apply their regular skills to the particular circumstances of disaster under the direction and guidance of experts in this jurisdiction. This is an uncontroversial position. The Army should support a subordinate settlement claim. It provides an example of how the Army can apply the principles I have suggested to clearly delineate a professional approach to understanding and articulating the Army's role in various jurisdictions.

The Army is not the sole profession upon which the nation relies in each jurisdiction, in fact, conceivably the Army could be rendered irrelevant in any one or all of the jurisdictions. In military affairs, the Army profession competes with the maritime profession (Navy and Marines) and the aerospace profession (Air Force) with respect to a variety of national objectives amenable to the use of force. Society, represented by its elected leaders, expects the Army to be effective, when called upon, to support national objectives in each of these jurisdictions. The Army provides expertise in each of these jurisdictions to address all or part of the challenges facing society. The Army is not necessarily sufficient or even necessary to address all challenges in these jurisdictions. Other professions offer expertise in each of these jurisdictions and form, along with the Army, the menu of professional capabilities from which American society can choose. The perception of utility of any particular profession within these jurisdictions is a function of the manner in which problems are defined, diagnosed and suggested for treatment. There are few clear, unequivocal connections between the challenges and the manner in which competing professions will perceive, define, diagnose and prescribe.

To take one example with regard to conventional war, it is not necessarily clear in advance as to what strategy is likely to prove most effective in compelling an enemy to do our will.¹⁴⁷ Will naval blockade be sufficient? Will air power alone be sufficient? Will it be necessary to seize and hold portions of territory? More commonly, all means that can contribute to success will be applied. The issue will be to determine an effective combination. More broadly, effective diplomacy (the expertise of Foreign Service professionals) can obviate the need for any military action. If there are a variety of effective combinations and permutations, assessment of relative risk and cost effectiveness will influence choices. The manner in which competing professions define and shape the issue will be important. For the use of force in war and the preparations for war, there is not likely to be one correct answer. As Warner Schilling noted,

Military science is not normally so exact as to rule out all but one school of thought on the question of how battles are to be fought and wars won. As a result, military planners frequently find themselves uncertain or divided regarding the kinds of preparations necessary to support the foreign policy purposes of the nation. There is, moreover, the additional complication that some purposes might alternatively be met through nonmilitary means, that is, through economic or diplomatic arrangements, or through the allocation of American resources to advance the military power of other nations.¹⁴⁸

Carl Builder provides a detailed analysis of the manner in which the United States Army, Navy and Air Force approach the issue of national security strategy using parochial institutional perspectives.¹⁴⁹ Each service differs in its dominant concept of war and the best means to carry it out. In an uncharitable light, these service specific diagnoses and suggested treatments are grounded in organizational self-interest. This does not,

¹⁴⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

¹⁴⁸ Warner R. Schilling, "The politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950." In *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets*, 1-266. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 13.

however, mean that the professionals advancing such arguments are unpatriotic or unreasonable. Each service's strategy is ultimately focused on the goal of achieving success for society. The services and their strategic leaders are responsible for articulating the appropriate ways in which service capabilities can best serve societal needs. This competition is a healthy one that identifies alternatives for national leaders. It must be recognized, however, that the degree to which one or more services are able to command legitimacy for its suggested solutions (treatments) over time has important implications for the other services. The other services sustain or create capabilities through a variety of methods. The government does not have infinite resources and must therefore constantly reevaluate trade-offs both across and within a variety of jurisdictions. The opportunity costs of defense are many. Choice among these opportunity costs is a constant of the national policy process. Legitimacy of military jurisdictions and the capabilities deemed essential for the society are a continuous topic of concern and evaluation. There is nothing self-evident or exclusive about the claims the Army advances concerning appropriate national strategy and appropriate resource allocation. Strategic leaders of the Army profession must clearly articulate the relevance of the Army's expertise to appropriate jurisdictions. It does this in a competitive, professional environment in which civilian leaders have the claims of other military services and, in some cases, other governmental agencies (e.g., the State Department) or non-governmental agencies (e.g., contractors) to provide expertise and effective performance in the same jurisdictions.

¹⁴⁹ Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, (A RAND Corporation Research Study), 1989, especially chapter 5, 57-66.

This is not necessarily a bad thing. For the country, it would seem relatively self-evident that it simply wants the appropriate ends of policy achieved in the most effective manner at the least possible cost. The lack of objective criteria to determine the relative value of one course of action or combination of means versus another simply suggests that there is value to the advice of various professions' leaders to clarify the relevance and application of their profession's expertise.

Defining Appropriate Jurisdictions: Practical Implications and Applications

The previous sections have mapped out a framework for considering the appropriate jurisdictions of the Army profession. There are many jurisdictions within which the Army is expected to operate effectively on behalf of national security objectives. In some, the Army shares jurisdiction with other professions—the other military services as well as civilian professions. Clearly, the hierarchy of jurisdictions requires that the Army place the greatest attention and emphasis on the jurisdictions for which it holds full and complete responsibility. The jurisdictions for which the Army has full responsibility are those relevant to leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force. In particular, this included all aspects of sustained land warfare (conventional and unconventional) as well as peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions where the potential for coercive force—if not its actual use—is required. These are the Army's highest priority missions. The Army must articulate its relevant dominance of these jurisdictions and must seek to sustain its professional expertise as the proponent and lead developer for expertise required for effective performance in these jurisdictions.

All other jurisdictions and missions are secondary. The common element of these secondary jurisdictions is the fungible utility of Army capabilities. Professionally, the Army does not possess unique expertise in these areas. Other professions or agencies possess the expertise to lead or manage operations in these realms. The Army may possess relevant expertise or capabilities that can be applied in these secondary jurisdictions interchangeably with non-Army expertise or capabilities—but at an opportunity cost to their Army applications. Examples of such missions include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and most aspects of homeland security.

Note that the relative priority of *professional* jurisdiction is an important distinction. There are certainly many tasks that Army units or Army individuals will be well-suited to perform in these jurisdictions that create minimal if any opportunity costs for the individuals or units involved (for example, a water purification unit purifying water in a disaster area will receive superb if not better training for work than they would from regular peacetime training). However, there is also no peculiar Army professional expertise needed to apply this capability in an environment where the use or potential use of coercive force is not an issue. A more appropriate way to conceptualize this would be to note that Army capabilities may be borrowed (or lent) for application in jurisdictions outside the Army profession. Professionally, the Army's role is advisory or subordinate within these jurisdictions. Strategic leaders of the Army profession should not seek and indeed should try to avoid accepting responsibility for these jurisdictions. Army leaders should, however, maintain the expertise to manage effective liaison with those individuals or professions that do control or lead these jurisdictions (political-social expertise).

Another way to look at it is that turf battles to define and control full, or primary jurisdictions are not only warranted but required. For secondary jurisdictions, such battles should not be joined. If *conscripted* to accept such secondary jurisdictions (a distinct possibility for a profession also defined by loyal service to society) professional leaders should actively seek appropriate ways to hand off, or spin-off, the jurisdiction. If there is no way to hand off or spin off such a jurisdiction, strategic leaders must explore adaptations to the profession that may involve segmenting off a portion of the profession to handle the new jurisdiction while nonetheless shielding the rest of the profession (e.g., the creation of specific constabulary forces for peacekeeping in benign environments).¹⁵⁰ Such jurisdictions might be accepted without being embraced.

The tasks society asks the Army to do may not change. Regardless, strategic leaders should understand and articulate the priority jurisdictions and the tasks within them for which the Army is appropriately expert and capable.

¹⁵⁰ An historical example of this may have been those portions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers responsible for domestic duties such as river/flood management.

Chapter 7: Summary & Recommendations

Military operations will continue to demand extraordinary dedication and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions. Our Total Force, composed of professionals armed with courage, stamina, and intellect, will succeed despite the complexity and pace of future operations.

Joint Vision 2020

General Principles for Drawing Boundaries

First and foremost, Strategic leaders of the Army profession must be clear on the principles that underlie arguments concerning the appropriate jurisdictions and expertise of the Army profession. In particular, there are some key cautions leaders should consider.

A good starting point is to be clear about where not to go:

The Army can't be all things to all people. There are more possible uses for the Army than the Army can reasonably accept. This requires professional priorities. This requires a clear understanding of opportunity costs.

The Army can't be passive about roles and missions. A 'Can do' approach, taken too far, can lead to drift and loss of focus based on the whims of non-expert decision-makers. This will create tensions within the profession as well as with civilian leaders. Loyalty to executing policy should not be confused with subjectively endorsing and embracing policy for reasons other than those within the purview of professional expertise.

On the other hand, the Army cannot insist upon preferred policies. Preferences, justified in terms of functional military imperatives (hence the legitimate realm of the profession's expertise) should be expressed as part of the policy process. Once a decision is made, however, attempts to insist on preferred policies by intervention in the political

process are wrong. Such attempts represent fundamental violations of the professionals' constitutional oaths and of the trust and legitimacy granted to the profession by the American people.

The Army can't become a partisan interest group. It must remain apolitical (which requires a clear understanding of where the profession fits within the framework of American professional and political society).

To implement these principles, there are two general recommendations I suggest.

Clarifying Jurisdictions with Leaders and Led.

To fix problems with lack of clarity concerning appropriate jurisdictions, Army leaders must work with both the civilian policy leaders and with the junior members of the profession. With regard to junior members of the Army profession, the Army's strategic leaders must articulate the multi-faceted demands of a full spectrum force and the attendant implications to the Army's professionals. With regard to civilian leaders, the Army's strategic leaders must be actively engaged in advising civilian leaders on how to define and clarify service jurisdictions. Army leaders cannot afford to be passive and merely accept civilian preferences. 'Can-do' acquiescence is a laudable trait when tasks are clear or decisions already made. A 'can-do' attitude and commitment to fundamental goals of national security does not require silence in shaping decisions. At the other extreme, it is also unacceptable for military leaders to insist on controlling the definition of jurisdictions. Strategic leaders of the Army profession must draw on their experience and vision for the profession to inform the decisions of civilian leaders.

Ultimately, military leaders are beholden to civilian leaders to decide upon the Army's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Army leaders must clearly articulate to civilian

leaders the impact of such decisions on the clarity of the Army's jurisdiction and the missions for which the Army forces are suitably prepared. On one hand, Army leaders must ensure that the profession's leaders and the soldiers they direct are clearly aware of the tasks for which they may be called upon in the realization of national security objectives. In this regard, continued emphasis on the "fight and win the nation's wars" mantra must be imbedded in a larger context of service to the nation on behalf of broad national security objectives. War is only one, albeit the most important, professional jurisdiction. On the other hand, strategic leaders of the Army must advise civilian leaders on appropriate definition of the Army's jurisdictions and the prospective costs of shifting jurisdictions capriciously. This is necessary to help maintain a consistent core identity for the members of the profession and reliable performance of the institution. In short, the strategic leaders of the Army profession play a critical role negotiating the profession's identity. This role is at the nexus of the profession's internally understood identity and the profession's responsiveness to societal (client) demands. As Chapter 6 suggested, strategic leaders of the Army must understand the priority, full and divided jurisdictions and the secondary, subordinate and advisory jurisdictions for the profession.

Overcoming Professional Development Legacies:

The changes required challenge critical elements of the Army's internal management structure. Army leaders must ensure that professional values—not bureaucratic imperatives—drive the military education and assignment system. The two key elements of this structure are the Army's professional military education system (PME) and the closely related assignment patterns that shape individual professionals.

Senior military leaders are not laterally appointed from other sectors of society. They must enter at the lower ranks of the profession and earn advancement to senior leadership within the boundaries of profession's assignment and promotion system. Only at the highest levels (general officer level) is there much latitude for civilian leaders outside the profession to exercise influence on the assignment or advancement of particular individuals. Hence, the development of senior leaders is a function of the armed services' systems of identifying, educating and promoting individuals. It is through this process of professional education and professional development that the services can establish and reinforce a concept of professionalism to meet the diverse and shifting challenges of an uncertain era.

This requires a vision of the profession's requirements in the future. This must be linked with a professional development system that can produce individuals to meet current and short run challenges as well as to adapt to uncertain challenges in the future. Such a system must place less emphasis on particular technical skills that are perishable and place greater emphasis on qualities of enduring value (physical, spiritual, and ethical) and the capacity to learn and grow professionally throughout a lifetime of service to the nation. Traditions that produce leaders who have simply mastered the technical skills of their predecessors to higher degrees of proficiency are likely to serve the nation poorly. In an era of rapidly changing technology, mastery of particular weapons and equipment may provide only fleeting benefit. More important is the intellectual agility of leaders to understand the dynamics of change and to be able to readily adapt new capabilities to enduring requirements and old capabilities to new requirements.

In general, this can be summarized a need for greater reliance on education as opposed to training of Army professionals. This is a challenge for the training focused system of the Cold War Army.

Obstacles to Change

There are several obstacles to change. These include the demonstrable success of the Army in performing its recent missions, the transaction costs of change, and the power of established organization culture. They are obstacles that must be acknowledged and confronted. They can be surmounted with difficulty. The following paragraphs describe the obstacles and suggest counters.

Arguing with Success

A significant challenge to making changes in the Army profession is the fact that there is no evidence of Army failure in the most important measures of Army effectiveness. In combat, the Army has performed very well since the end of the Vietnam War. The most dramatic examples of Army successes are Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom (the ongoing mission of the Afghanistan War against terror). In its most important jurisdiction, conventional war, the Army met the challenges of combat with exceptional performance. In operations other than war, to include Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the Army has also performed superbly. This is not to say that the Army has performed flawlessly, but, there is, thankfully, no major operational failure that prompts us to question the Army's decisions of how best to organize, equip and train its forces.

Countering this argument is difficult but important. Past success does not guarantee future performance. As General Douglas MacArthur so eloquently put it, "We

must hold our minds alert...The next war will be won in the future, not in the past. We must go on, or we will go under.”¹⁵¹ Military force in particular is the subject of constant scrutiny and the attempts by our adversaries to nullify or counter our capabilities. The United States should not be content to rest on its laurels. The fact that the U.S. Army has yet to fail in a manner that *requires* change is a weak excuse for not making changes that have the potential to avert a potential failure in the future. The developing consensus is that there is a fundamental shift in the nature of the challenges faced by the US Army. The shift in these challenges requires changes to the Army profession. Whether there is a revolution in military affairs or merely the lack of certainty about the shape of future conflict, the Army must continually validate its choices with due regard to the shadow of the future. The Army recognizes that choices now severely constrain capabilities of the future. This is true with regard to choices of weapon systems and equipment. It is also true with regard to the nature of recruitment, training and development that will grow the strategic leaders of tomorrow’s Army profession from the junior members of today’s profession.

Overcoming Transaction Costs

Another obstacle is the need for significant change to pass a high test of value to justify the related disruptions. In other words, the transaction costs of executing a particular change (to include anticipated second and third order effects) must be low enough or the value of the anticipated outcome high enough to make the transaction costs acceptable. Many of the changes suggested in this study create high costs in the short run with less certain future benefits. Changes contemplated for the personnel management

¹⁵¹ General Douglas MacArthur, as quoted by LTG William J. Lennox Jr. (USMA Superintendent). “The Supe’s Letter: A Soldier of the 21st Century.” *Assembly LX*, no. 4 (March/April 2002), 8.

system will be very difficult. Even the most clearly justified changes must outweigh the cost of problems generated by personnel turmoil, career anxiety, and social disruption. These are values that are hard to measure or compare. In the wake of the Cold War, one of the most commonly cited problems for the downsized force was uncertainty and anxiety about the future of the organization and the effect on its members' lives. Standardized and stable career patterns can be a source of comfort even if they are no longer optimally aligned with the profession's long-term interests.

Strategic leaders of the profession must be able to articulate the value of changes that warrant the short-term disruptions. This requires courage of conviction and candor. The short-term costs to individuals must be justified in a reasoned, coherent articulation of the profession's long-term effectiveness.

To change this system will induce tremendous anxiety among those who have come to rely on its predictability. This will be a powerful argument against any radical restructuring for the officer personnel management system. Fundamentally, it will constrain radical proposals and instead rely on changes that gently coax the flow of the mature river of personnel assignments into a new channel. There is a short-term quality of life concern for the stability and predictability for soldiers and their families that had been a critical initiative from General Shinseki in response to earlier complaints from the force. However, the short-term costs of such turmoil should be offset by greater career satisfaction and a more rational justification of the profession's focus. This justification must be grounded firmly in the imperatives of the profession's values and not the imperatives of bureaucratic management.

Changing Institutional Culture

The Army personnel system is a successful one that has done much to render predictable the patterns of an Army career. Paths to future responsibility and success are relatively well defined. Senior officers successful at treading these paths and confident in the quality of their career model reinforce those elements that served as critical landmarks in their career patterns. Similarly, particular school and training requirements have been incorporated into the pattern to assist in the appropriate assembly of skills and experience along the path of professional development. There is certainly much to recommend this system as an appropriate response to the demands of running a large organization effectively and efficiently. The large and diverse structure of the United States Army demands a rational system of personnel control and management. Institutionalized in its structure and process are the assumptions and experiences of generations. The system operationalizes judgments and collective wisdom about appropriate professional development. The difficulty in creating and adjusting this structure were immense. The power of this system over the careers and lives of millions is indisputable. One of its greatest features is the predictability and standardization such a system provides. Considering its power to move its human charges and their families all over the world, such predictability is a valuable aspect of the organization's quality of life. But the most important rationale for this personnel management system is its effectiveness in supporting fundamental national defense.

The current system was created in 1971 as part of the post-Vietnam War training revolution. It was extremely successful in overcoming the problems of the decentralized and capricious 'old-boy' network. There are certainly very useful aspects of the officer

management system that must be retained, however, it is time to reexamine the premises upon which it was created during the Cold War and suggest changes that will better permit personnel policies to serve the changing and uncertain environment of the 21st Century. It is not sacred. The highly articulated bureaucratic structures of personnel command cannot be allowed to dictate the principles of enlightened personnel management.

Recommendations for Further Study

The focus of this study has been on the identification and explanation of a preliminary map of expert knowledge for the profession coupled with a suggested framework for defining and clarifying the legitimate jurisdictions of the profession. The map of expert knowledge consists of two main components: an overall map of the expertise required by the profession and a map of how this expertise should be distributed among individual professionals. Jurisdictions are defined in negotiation between the strategic leaders of the profession and the clients of the profession—American society as represented by its civilian representatives. The Army has a compelling interest to define these jurisdictions as clearly as possible. These jurisdictions are dynamically related to the expertise of the profession. The unique abstract knowledge that defines the profession should justify full and complete jurisdiction over the central problems this knowledge is intended to address. The Army's expertise is the abstract knowledge of leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force. Conventional land warfare is the realm of practical application for which the Army claims and expects full and complete jurisdiction. There are other jurisdictions within which this expertise is useful, however, these additional jurisdictions are ones for which the Army has no

exclusive claim. As directed, the Army can apply its expertise to these jurisdictions, but should generally seek to avoid them. Strategic leaders of the Army profession must negotiate with civilian leaders to explain, in professional terms, the manner in which military capabilities relate to potential jurisdictions. For these lesser jurisdictions, there is a two-fold responsibility. One is delineate the appropriate relationship to Army expertise that validates Army participation in such jurisdictions, albeit in a limited capacity. The other is to oppose the mal-utilization of the Army for missions in jurisdictions beyond its expertise.

Additional study is necessary to refine the map of the profession's expert knowledge and the expert knowledge of individual professionals. Also, additional work is needed to develop the specific professional development pathways to create this expertise in individuals. The principles that have allowed me to suggest the boundaries of the Army's expert knowledge may suggest different conclusions to others. I have certainly not defined immutable truth for the future of the Army profession. There are many professional judgments that require scrutiny. Ultimately, the specific decisions needed to operationalize this approach are the responsibility of the profession's strategic leaders.

Additionally, this framework is a useful point of departure for more detailed examination of sub-elements of the Army profession. Additional study and application by leaders of the current Army branches and functional areas would be useful to help define the expert knowledge of branches and the jurisdictions within which they should appropriately operate. In other words, there is certainly room for additional professional competition within the Army and within the other branches of service. I have

deliberately maintained the focus of this study at the institutional level of the Army. The map provided is analogous to a large-scale map of terrain, such a 1:250,000 scale map. More definition, analogous to a 1:50,000 map for example, will help us to better see how these principles apply to the specialties that comprise the profession. The future of the Infantry profession, Armor profession, Field Artillery profession and numerous other core areas of Army expert knowledge are useful adjuncts to this study that have yet to be written.

Although this study certainly contains broad implications for other members of the organization (warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, junior enlisted soldiers and civilians), it does not provide detailed analysis or recommendations for the transformation of these members' roles. This is an area of fruitful additional study.¹⁵² A key aspect of such an analysis would include the manner in which warrant officer and non-commissioned officer specialization might incorporate those tasks formerly expected of commissioned officers, which no longer require the application of abstract professional knowledge. In other words, the deprofessionalization of some portions of Army practice may still warrant the maintenance of knowledge resident within the organization in some other form. Restructured warrant and enlisted occupational specialties may prove an appropriate mechanism for assimilation of such skills. Similarly, it may also be appropriate to restructure such tasks as part of the Army's civilian work force.

¹⁵² As part of the Army Training and Leader Development panels, there are follow on efforts to the officer study to address warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and Army civilians. The implications of this study could be used to modify the results of these other panels.

Conclusion

First and foremost, the bond of leader and led in selfless service to country remains the keystone of our ability to venture into harm's way, to sustain the confidence of our political and popular leaders, and to protect our nation's interests.¹⁵³

Army leaders must create and sustain a strong, healthy relationship between the Army's professional officers and the society they serve. To do this, Army leaders must think strategically about the future of the profession. The Army must have clearly understood jurisdictions for action and well understood specialized expertise to accomplish society's requirements within these jurisdictions. To make this possible, strategic leaders must ensure that the educational and professional development process match society's needs. Strategic leaders of the Army must negotiate with civilian leaders representing society to prevent drift and confusion about the profession's jurisdiction and expertise. Such drift and confusion are a prominent problem of the current policy climate. The Army is at a crossroads. It needs strategic leadership of the profession to map out the required expert knowledge for specific professional jurisdictions and to develop the individual professionals to apply this professional expertise appropriately.

¹⁵³ Montgomery C. Meigs, "Operational Art in the New Century," Parameters (Spring 2001), 6.

Appendix

Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession for the 21st Century

PowerPoint slide presentation by the author
For colloquium at the United States Military Academy
Department of Social Sciences,
3 June 2002

[33 slides with notes]

Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession for the 21st Century

US Naval War College
Advanced Research Program
Spring 2002

Presentation at USMA, 3 June 2002

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DRAFT

summary of ARP
project. Do not use
or quote without
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*Comments and
questions are
encouraged!!!*

Outline

- Central Question
- Thesis
- Inspiration
- Project Objective
- Intellectual Framework
- Historical Overview
- Current efforts to revitalize the Army
- Framing Professional Change
- Defining the Army's Professional Expertise
 - The Army Profession's expertise
 - The Army Professionals' Expertise
- Defining the Army's Jurisdictions
- Obstacles to Change
- Summary/Conclusion

Central Question

**How should Army and
national leaders define
the future of the Army
Profession?**

Thesis

There is a professional crisis in the United States Army that threatens the institution and its ability to serve American society effectively. This crisis is a result of internal perceptions of the profession's appropriate expertise and jurisdiction that are in conflict with the demands placed upon the profession by American society and its civilian leaders. Army and civilian leaders must better define and develop the expertise and jurisdiction of the Army profession to serve national goals.

Drift and confusion about who, what we are and what we want to be (experts at what, in what realms?)

Full spectrum dominance—nice bumper sticker – too fuzzy and ambiguous

Needs clarity

Need to **prioritize** spectrum (where we really belong, where we don't belong)

Inspiration

- Personal Experience: Tensions in the field Army concerning what we are and where we're going
- Recent publications:
 - = ***American Military Culture in the 21st Century*** (CSIS)
 - = ***Soldiers and Civilians*** (Feaver, Kohn et al)
 - = ***Future of the Army Profession*** (Snider, Watkins et al) [Spring 2002]

I have been inspired to pursue this research both by my personal experiences in the tactical Army as well as by professional readings in recent years.

Recent assignments:

- Graduate School, Princeton University, 1993-95 (Security Studies); Ph.D. completed 2000 (Dissertation: Shaping American Military Capabilities in the Post Cold-War Era)
- Assistant Professor of Social Sciences, USMA 1995-98 (taught American Politics and International Relations)
- 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1998-2001 (AFSCOORD, BN XO, DIVARTY XO)
- College of Naval Command & Staff, Newport RI 2001-2002 (Anticipated graduation June 2002)

Next Assignment: Instructor, Strategy and Policy Department, Naval War College.

There are tensions that threaten the Army profession and I am deeply concerned about what we can do to fix these tensions.

Snider and Watkins edited volume based on a June 2001 Conference. Book: *The Future of the Army Profession*, McGraw-Hill 2002.

Project Objective

- Create a draft map of the Army's expert knowledge to inform and reform its educational and developmental systems
(Snider and Watkins, Conclusion 2, p.538)
 - *Suggested framework of the Army Profession's expertise (institutional)*
 - *Suggested framework of the Army Professionals' expertise (individual)*
- Generate or advance debate on the Army profession's future

Create DRAFT map of the Army profession looking both at the nature of the expertise needed by the Army as an institution as well as suggest how this expertise can be acquired and organized among the individuals of the profession.

Suggest ways in which expertise relates to jurisdictions.

Primary audience: Strategic leaders of the Army (Particularly Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff principals)

Generate debate among Army professionals. Develop useful framework for further efforts.

Framework: General utility to form basis for discussion

Implications and Applications: **ONE** view (mine) among many possible views.
DECISIONS ON IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS BELONG TO THE STRATEGIC LEADERS OF THE PROFESSION!!!!

Intellectual Framework (1 of 2)

- Profession: Expertise, Responsibility, Corporateness (Huntington)
- Nature of Civil-Military relations
 - Autonomous (Huntington) – Objective control, deliberate gap: Define boundaries as clearly as possible
- Abbott – System of professions
 - Professions define and defend expertise and jurisdictions in competition with other professions
 - Expertise
 - "The tasks of professions are human problems amenable to expert service." (Abbott, p. 35)
 - Includes diagnoses, inference, and treatment based on abstract knowledge
 - Jurisdiction
 - Development of professionals

Definition of profession from Huntington's "The Soldier and the State"

Huntington: Need for separation of military and civilian realms. Objective control by militarizing the military (p. 83) (keep military focused on military tasks)

Abbott: How professions define themselves in relation to other professions and society. Competitive interaction with other professions to determine boundaries of professional jurisdiction within which they practice their expertise.

Intellectual Framework (2 of 2)

- ▶ Snider & Watkins – Competitive Jurisdictions of the Army Profession
 - External
 - ▶ Conventional War
 - ▶ Unconventional War
 - ▶ Operations Other than War
 - ▶ Homeland Defense
 - Internal
 - ▶ Develop Expert Knowledge
 - Military technical
 - Ethical
 - Political Social
 - Human Development
 - ▶ Develop Future Professionals with Expertise

From Snider and Watkins, p. 8

Army competes in these jurisdictions with other professionals.

This is descriptive as well as normative.

Military technical Expert knowledge: “How the profession prepares for and conducts land operations combining Army soldier with organizations, doctrine, and technology.” (p. 101)

Ethical Expert knowledge: Professional ethics concerning the nature of professional moral duties—to members of the institution and to society. Issues of candor, trust, and character. (p. 291)

Political-Social Expert Knowledge: Political and social literacy concerning the interactions with the Army’s elected and appointed civilian leaders. Liaison expertise to manage interaction between the Army and the broader defense community (public, industry, government) (p. 197)

Human Development Expert Knowledge: How the profession prepares people for its purposes. Focuses on Human resource management and human development (physiology, human behavior, spirituality) (p. 355 & 439)

Historical Overview

[Summary of Directed Research Elective]

- > Upton's Legacy: Professional, "Big War" Army
- > Distractions: Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
- > 1865-2001 [See summary—next slide]
- > *Future: FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE*
(Information RMA and global leadership)

I conducted a directed research elective during the winter term at the Naval War College concentrating on the future of the Army profession. I did a survey of the literature on the Army profession and also worked with Dr Snider at USMA to find out more about the project he led (along with Dr Gayle Watkins)

The historical survey of Army history shows that this is something that past Army leaders have done haphazardly at best. The general summary is on the handout I provided. I have identified the tension between the stated preference for the 'Big wars' and the incessant intrusion of non-war missions as a key professional challenge. Army leaders have declared that the Army must be able to dominate along the spectrum of military operations from peace to war. But they have done this without reconciling it with the definition of the professions expertise and jurisdiction.

Joke: MOOTW = "Military operations other than what we signed up for"

MOOTW: Difference between coercive force MOOTW (very compatible) and alternative use of Army ability MOOTW (less compatible & desirable)

Historical Summary of Elements Influencing Army Professionalism

	1865-98	1898-1916	1918-39	1945-60	1972-82	1990-2001	Future(?)
Description	Professional Seeds	Professionals Defined	Competent Cadre	Cold War Confusion	Hollow but focused	Triumphant but Uncertain	FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANT
Key leaders	Sherman, Upton	Root	Pershing, MacArthur	Taylor	Westmoreland, Abrams	???	???
Impetus	Civil War & Prussian example	Spanish-American War	WWI & Industrial RMA	WWII, Korea, Nuclear RMA	Post-Vietnam & VOLAR	End of Cold War	Information RMA & global leadership
Threats	War	Indians	Great Powers	USSR + Allies, Nuclear War	USSR + Allies	2 x Major Theater Wars	Near-peer/ Great power
	MOOTW	Southern occupation & labor unrest	Colonial constabulary, PI Counter Insurgency	Philippine constabulary, CCC	Postwar occupation duty	n/a	Peace Ops (Somalia, Haiti, B-H, Kosovo) Counter-Terrorism, asymmetric attacks, Peace Ops
U.S. International disposition	Isolation [Continental Power—'Manifest Destiny' realized]	Imperialism [Budding Great Power]	Isolation [Great Power in Hiding]	Bi-polar Balancing [Superpower]	Bi-polar Détente [Chastened Superpower]	Engagement & Enlargement [Hyperpower]	International Leadership [Guiding Power]
Assessment of strategic leadership	Prophetic but ineffective	Effective but incomplete	Effective and overwhelming success	Mixed effectiveness [ineffective re: Vietnam]	Effective but narrow	Professional Tension	Profession Clarified?

Table 1: Historical Summary of Army Professionalism

Summary of findings for directed research elective.

My assessment of some of the key elements that have influenced the development of the Army profession over time.

Is it useful to create a distinction between:

- War
- Other Coercive force operations (CFOs?)
- Alternative Applications of Army Abilities (A4?)

Historical Summary of Elements Influencing Army Professionalism

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	MOOTW	Southern occupation & labor unrest	Colonial constabulary, PI Counter Insurgency	Philippine constabulary, CCC	n/a	Peace Ops (Somalia, Haiti, B-H, Kosovo)	Counter-Terrorism, asymmetric attacks, Peace Ops
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Assessment of strategic leadership	Prophetic but ineffective	Effective but incomplete	Effective and overwhelming success	Mixed effectiveness [ineffective re: Vietnam]	Effective but narrow	Professional Tension	Profession Clarified?

Table 1: Historical Summary of Army Professionalism

Current Tensions

> Significant tensions between Cold War legacy and future 'Full Spectrum' demands

- The immediate Army legacy of the Cold War is the post-Vietnam 'Training Revolution'
 - > Enemy-centric: Soviet Focus
 - > Theater-centric: Europe Focus
 - > Jurisdiction: Conventional "Big War" focus
 - > Professional Response:
 - AirLand Battle Doctrine
 - CTC training focus
 - Military schools focused on training for next assignments
 - Assignment templates clarified and streamlined
- Post-Cold War Transformation driven by 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (technology focus)
 - > Enemies: Uncertain (but likely to act asymmetrically)
 - > Theater: Uncertain
 - > Jurisdiction: 'Full spectrum dominance'
 - > Professional Response:
 - Full spectrum doctrine
 - Conventional war training focus plus deployment driven training/retraining
 - Few changes to school system or assignment template

Ongoing Army Professional Revitalization Efforts

- Transformation Campaign Plan—Training and Leader development
- Army Training and Leader Development Panels (ATLDP) (Army G3, CAL)
 - Council of Colonels
 - General Officer Steering Committee
- Intermediate level education study (CUBIC)
 - CGSOC reorganization
- Company Grade OES Study (CUBIC, forthcoming, Jun 02)
 - Basic Course, CCC, CAS3 reorganization
- Pre-Commissioning Standardization (USMA, Cadet Command, OCS)
- Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC)
- Defining Officership and the Army service ethic (SCPME)
- Army Knowledge Online – Reference for knowledge and information (to support life-long learning)

Focus of pre-commissioning standards is military training. Military programs of pre-commissioning sources are well standardized.

Inconsistent emphasis on pre-commissioning academic program other than USMA.

AKO focused on Pull system of knowledge (available if needed). Issue will be creating the culture to make it useful (officers need to want to pull the information).

Army Professional Revitalization Analysis

- > Current process disjoint
- > Army G3 recently appointed proponent; still trying to integrate
- > Reform of OES proceeding piecemeal without review of overall concept
- > Missing piece: Need Human Resource management reform
 - = Assignment template hardening—ticket punching dominant (overrides professional values with bureaucratic values)
 - = Transformation reliant on support for new promotion pathways (intent of OPMS XXI—implementation ongoing)
- > Will require cultural shift from training revolution to revolution in human development (training, experience and education)

Framing Professional Change

- Strategic leaders must define the Army's "Map of expert knowledge"
 - This study provides a draft of what this map might look like, both at institutional and individual levels
 - Defining the Profession's expertise
- Strategic leaders of the Army profession must clarify jurisdictions through negotiations
 - Externally: With civilian leaders
 - Internally: With Army professionals (to attain understanding/ acceptance by members of the profession)
- Prioritize professional imperatives ahead of bureaucratic
 - First: Create consensus on how the Army develops (concept of career)
 - Second: Reform human development system
 - Officer education
 - Officer training
 - Officer personnel management system (evaluation, certification, and assignment)
- This is an Iterative process

Defining Expert Knowledge

Core or 'Heartland' of the
Army's Professional Expert Knowledge:

*Leadership of Army soldiers
in the organized application
of coercive force*

The peculiar skill of the military officer is the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization, a profession, whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people; for the Army officer such development, operation and leadership occurs incident to sustaining America's dominance in land warfare. In abbreviated form, I will refer to this core expertise as 'Leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force.'^[1]

^[1] I acknowledge the help of Don Snider in crafting this wording for the nature of the Army profession's core expertise. E-mail communication with the author 29 May 2002.

Map of Expert Knowledge: The Army Profession's Expertise

	Expertise Applicability and Priority →	Ia. Army lead	Ib. Military unique	II. Army specific application	III. General application army needs internally	IV. General application, army needs externally
	Character of expertise →	Core	Core	Core support	Wagon	Borrowed
	How Acquired →	Army exclusive	Military exclusive	Army and Society	Army sponsored	Contract
	Educational responsibility →	Army	Military	Society with Army component	Society with Army quality control	Society
	Contribution →	Army	Military	Army	Army & Society	Society
Military Technical Expert Knowledge	Leadership of cohesive force	X (land warfare)	X (general warfare)			
	Combat	X				
	Combat opt	X				
	Joint ops		X			
	Combined ops		X			
	Info technology			X		
Human Development Expert Knowledge	Engineering & Science			X		
	Admin. bodies			X		
	Leadership			X		
	Social Work				X	
	Physical Fitness			X		
	Human Behaviour			X		
Moral-Ethical Expert Knowledge	Education			X		
	Medicine			X		
	Legal			X		
	Religious				X	
Political Social Expert Knowledge	Professional Ethics	X				
	Moral Reasoning	X				
	Diplomacy (attaché)			X		
	Political Analysis				X	
Other	Counter-Military		X			
	Resource Mgmt				X	
	Basic Research					X

Table 2: Map of Profession's Expert knowledge (institutional perspective)

This chart is a summary of areas of expertise and their relationship to the Army as an institution.

Changes since 17 May. Added: Moral Reasoning to Moral-Ethical.

Added Priorities to columns. Engineering & Science

Other possible changes:

- Prioritize within categories

- Moral expertise

- Character development

- Spirituality instead of religion

- Developmental* responsibility (instead of educational)

Map of Expert Knowledge: The Army Profession's Expertise

	Expertise Applicability and Priority →	Ia. Army lead		Ib. Military unique		II. Army specific application		III. General application army needs internally		IV. General application, army needs episodically	
		Core		Core		Core support		Liaison		Borrowed	
Military Technical Expert Knowledge	Character of expertise →	Core		Core		Core support		Liaison		Borrowed	
	How Acquired →	Army exclusive		Military exclusive		Army and Society		Army sponsored		Contract	
	Educational responsibility →	Army		Military		Society with Army component		Society with Army quality control		Society	
	Certification →	Army		Military		Army		Army & society		Society	
	Leadership of coercive force	X (land warfare)		X (general warfare)							
	Combat	X									
	Combat spt	X									
Human Development Expert Knowledge	Joint opns			X							
	Combined opns			X							
	Info Technology					X					
	Engineering & Science					X					
	Admin/Logistics					X					
	Leadership					X					
	Social Work							X			
Moral-Ethical Expert Knowledge	Physical Fitness					X					
	Human Behavior					X					
	Education					X					
	Medicine					X					
	Legal					X					
	Religious							X			
	Professional Ethics	X									
Political Social Expert Knowledge	Moral Reasoning	X									
	Diplomacy (attaché)					X					
	Political Analysis							X			
	Civil-Military			X							
	Resource Mgmt							X			
	Basic Research									X	

Table 2: Map of Profession's Expert knowledge (institutional perspective)

Other Relevant Aspects of the Profession's Expertise

- **Where applied?** Violent or potentially violent environment. If in combat zone, expectation of being affected by violence is a key consideration (e.g., medics, chaplains, support personnel, pilots).
- **Where acquired?** Source of professional expertise development. For Army lead/dominant expertise, Army is responsible for entire lifecycle of expertise development and application. For specific Army applications, the Army is responsible for adding the Army specific elements to the individuals' expertise developed elsewhere. For generally applicable expertise, Army leaves training and development of the expertise to other elements of society, but, must ensure quality control of its application to Army purposes.
- **How applied?** Is there an ethical or moral element peculiar to its Army application (e.g., life or death impact). Implies an important component of ethical management and control that may differ from society more generally. Good example may be application of information technology in a warfare form (to hurt, kill or disable others through effects on national infrastructure or other public goods).

Admiral Stansfield Turner, 1972:

"I am persuaded that we can be a profession only as long as we ourselves are pushing the frontiers of knowledge in our field."^[1]

^[1] Admiral Stansfield Turner speaking in 1972, quoted in John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III and John R. Wadleigh. *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984, 285.

Map of Expert Knowledge: The Army Professionals' Expertise

- Professional Development Framework Principles:
 - Full Spectrum foundation of Expert Knowledge (pre-commissioning)
 - Military-Technical
 - Human Development
 - Ethical-Moral
 - Political-Social
 - Define Comprehensive Professional Development Model
 - Education: Officer education system (OES)
 - Experience: Officer assignment system (PERSCOM)
 - Meta-competencies: Adaptability and self-awareness (from ATLDP)
 - Divergent paths
 - Core (Army officers)
 - Operational units (Combat, Combat support—OPMS XXI OPCF)
 - Strategic Leaders of the Army profession
 - Supporting/Liaison (Army Officers):
 - Full-Career Specialization (Medical, Dental, Legal, Religious)
 - Mid-Career Specialization (OPMS XXI ISCF, IOCF, OSCF)
 - Contracted (civilians):
 - Basic Research and analysis
 - Non-combat related administration, logistics, and support

Pre-Commissioning Foundation

Area	Military-Technical		Human Development	
Program	Military	Academic	Military	Academic
Examples	Basic Training (Weapons, common Tasks) Field Training Small unit ops	Science (physics, chemistry) Math Engineering Information technology	Leadership Physical fitness Discipline	Psychology Physiology

Area	Ethical-Moral		Social-Political	
Program	Military	Academic	Military	Academic
Examples	Laws of War Professional ethics Army values Officership	Philosophy English Law (constitutional & military)	Military History Civil-military relations	US History American Politics International Relations Economics Language

= Common Core pre-commissioning Standards

- Military Tasks
- Academic curriculum

Examples drawn mainly from USMA

Pre-Commissioning Foundation


Area	Military-Technical		Human Development	
	Military	Academic	Military	Academic
Examples	Basic Training (Weapons, common Tasks) Field Training Small unit ops	Science (physics, chemistry) Math Engineering Information technology	Leadership Physical fitness Discipline	Psychology Physiology

Area	Ethical-Moral		Social-Political	
	Military	Academic	Military	Academic
Examples	Laws of War Professional ethics Army values Officership	Philosophy English Law (constitutional & military)	Military History Civil-military relations	US History American Politics International Relations Economics Language

Common Core pre-commissioning Standards

- ▶ Military Tasks
- ▶ Academic curriculum

Developing General Professional Expertise (1 of 2)



* (nominative assignment) Relative weight of areas of expertise will vary depending on the nature of the nominative assignment. Likely to be highly specialized within a particular area of expertise (e.g., professor at USMA, Branch school instructor, CTC observer/controller, Active Component/Reserve Component [AC/RC] unit advisor) [Question: Possible tangent—what is the appropriate prioritization and justification of current nominative assignment pattern for branch qualified Captains? Justification based on professional development of the individuals? Simply needs of the Army to fill some spaces with any faces for at least a short period of time (i.e., recruiting, ROTC, AC/RC)]

Basic Army Branches are:

Combat Arms

11 Infantry
12 Armor
13 Field Artillery
14 Air Defense Artillery
15 Aviation
18 Special Forces
21 Engineers

Combat Support

42 Adjutant General
25 Signal Corps
31 Military Police
35 Military Intelligence
74 Chemical

Combat Service Support

44 Finance
88 Transportation
91 Ordnance
92 Quartermaster

Developing General Professional Expertise (1 of 2)




TABLE 3: Officer Professional Development pattern: Operations Career Field (basic branches)


Developing General Professional Expertise (2 of 2)

- Core Professional Experts: Combat and combat support (OPMS XXI OPCF)
 - Start with broad based education and training in areas of Army expertise.
 - Develop into strategic leaders of the profession applying broad based Army expertise
 - Reinforced by school and assignment patterns
- Less emphasis on military-technical expertise over time
- Greater emphasis on moral-ethical and political social expertise over time
- Human development expertise (especially leadership) critical throughout but particularly in command positions and tactical unit assignments

[Question: Is there a better way to conceptualize the role of CSS branches? To what degree do officers of these branches relate to the core expertise concerning the leadership of coercive force? There are certainly unique logistical demands and expertise at higher organizational levels, however, for tactical units, especially at BN and brigade, leadership in potential combat zone seems more relevant than admin or logistics expertise.]

How do CSS branches fit?

Developing Specialized Professional Expertise (1 of 2)



This diagram simply maps out the specialties as they currently exist in the Army.

An important point of discussion is the degree to which the non-operations career field specialties listed in the top half of the table necessarily require professional army experience as a junior officer.

Specialties that are not unique to the Army *do* lend themselves to lateral entry by specialists from society who do not have previous Army experience. Examples include civilian professors at USMA, public affairs experts, etc. The argument for using officers with significant Army experience in the combat and combat support arms in these specialties would seem to rest heavily on the degree to which such experience is necessary to help integrate this knowledge to better serve the specific requirements of the profession. For example, regarding Academy professors, arguments for training and using members of the Army profession for these tasks include the importance of using role models from the Army's core expertise to guide the education of aspiring professionals as well as to provide this understanding of the Army's core expertise to inform the appropriate integration of supporting expertise.

Developing Specialized Professional Expertise (1 of 2)





Table 4: Army Officer Professional Development pattern: Non-Operations Career Field (Functional Areas and special branches)

Developing Specialized Professional Expertise (2 of 2)

- Specialized experts to support core, general experts
- Mid-career specialization (OSCF, ISCF, IOCF): After 10 years, general, tactical experience, officers specialize into one area of expert knowledge
- Full-career specialization: Medical, Religious, Legal experts apply other professions' expertise within Army jurisdictions

Defining Army Jurisdictions

- ▶ Strategic leaders of the Army profession must clarify nature of Army jurisdictional claims: *must relate to the leadership of coercive force.*
 - Conventional War
 - Unconventional War  *[why not just 'war'?]*
 - Military Operations Other Than War
 - Homeland Security
- ▶ Must be able to articulate why other jurisdictions are not appropriate for Army (e.g. drug interdiction, domestic policing)
 - Misappropriation of Army assets and expertise
 - Lack of connection to leadership of coercive force

Army Jurisdictions (1 of 5)

➤ Conventional War: Full or divided jurisdiction

- = Land Warfare: Full jurisdiction (Army heartland)
"...complete, legally established control." (Abbott, 71)
- = Joint Warfare: Divided (shared with other services)
- = Combined Warfare: Divided (shared with other services and allied armed forces)

Abbott terms (p. 71):

Full

Divided

Intellectual

Advisory

Subordinate

Army Jurisdictions (2 of 5)

➤ Unconventional War

- = Low intensity/guerrilla warfare:
 - Full jurisdiction for ground operations (e.g., Army Special Forces) and for training foreign armies
 - Advisory jurisdiction for police functions, local security, civil affairs
- = Nuclear Warfare: Advisory jurisdiction. No unique Army perspective or competence. Can advise regarding general issues of deterrence and escalation

[Nuclear war??? Should this even be included?]

Army Jurisdictions (3 of 5)

> Military Operations Other Than War

- = Peace enforcement/Peacemaking: Full (to deter violence or, if deterrence fails, execute combat operations)
- = Humanitarian Assistance: Subordinate (to provide support to other agencies on limited basis)
- = Military Advisor Support: Full with respect other national armies
- = Peacekeeping: Subordinate. If there is minimal or no likelihood of combat, Army has no special expertise--just trained and ready manpower.
- = Law enforcement support: Subordinate and advisory. Some military capabilities have incidental value to law enforcement activities (e.g., surveillance, manpower)
- = Disaster Relief: Subordinate. Trained and ready manpower that can operate in austere environments

Army Jurisdictions (4 of 5)

▼ Homeland Security

- Full with regard to attacks or defense against enemy armed forces at home or abroad
- Intellectual: Training for Chemical, biological, radiological attack
- Subordinate: Trained and ready manpower for attack response, disaster relief, and other labor intensive tasks
- Advisory: Advise domestic agencies on security missions and tasks (e.g., site security, quick reaction forces)

Army Jurisdictions (5 of 5)

> Internal Jurisdictions

- Develop Expert Knowledge
 - > Must be on leading edge of expert knowledge when Army has **full** jurisdiction.
 - > Must master expert knowledge in other areas that support the profession (draw from other professions and society)
- Develop Future Professionals with Expertise
 - > Develop Army professionals with military-technical, human development, political-social and ethical-moral expert knowledge
 - > Develop related educational and assignment systems to support Army professional education and Army professional experience

Negotiating Jurisdictions

- Must clarify jurisdictions with leaders and led
- What not to do:
 - Can't be all things to all people ('full spectrum dominance' too broad). Don't promise too much.
 - Can't be too narrow minded—can't just do the 'big wars.' Ahistorical and too restrictive (can lose professional jurisdictions to other professions)
 - Can't be passive about roles and missions. Don't be too 'can do.' Don't accept too much.
 - Can't insist on preferences: Debate during policy process, acceptance of decision when made (to do otherwise violates professional ethic)
 - Can't become a partisan interest group. Must remain scrupulously apolitical—as an institution and among its strategic leaders.

Must be Clear about value trade-offs
(Capabilities vs. appropriate expertise and jurisdiction)

Can't be all things to all people: Too many possible uses of military capabilities. More than Army can reasonably accept: Must make trade-offs and understand opportunity costs.

Obstacles to Change

- Bureaucratic inertia (especially of assignment and personnel management system)
 - Predictable and stable
 - Quality of life impact
 - Bureaucratic numbers vs. qualitative assessment
- Army Success—if it ain't broke, don't fix it
- Uncertainty: Can't ID clearly "right" decisions; don't want to be clearly wrong (risk averse?)

Summary/Conclusion

- ▶ The Army is at a crossroads
- ▶ There is a lack of clarity concerning future Army professional expertise and appropriate Army jurisdictions.
 - Partly due to mismatch between Rhetoric of future "Full Spectrum dominance" and reality of Cold War residual "Big War" focus that largely defines the current force.
 - The transition and accompanying confusion account for much of the turmoil and tension in the officer ranks
- ▶ Army transformation must include professional transformation
- ▶ Professional values must dominate, guide bureaucratic choices

Train for certainty,
Lead Human Development for uncertainty

Administration

> ARP Advisors:

- Professor Thomas Grassey, NWC (Naval War College Review)
- Colonel Bill Brown, US Army, NWC (JMO)
- Dr. Don Snider, USMA (Department of Social Sciences)

> Disposition

- NWC ARP deadline: 5 Jun 02
- Possible Parameters Article: Fall 02
- Possible follow on studies to apply to other services?
Individual Army branches?

Glossary

Acronyms

ADA	Air Defense Artillery (Army combat support branch)
AOWC	Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (proposed OPCF follow on course for ILE)
AR	Armor (Army combat arms branch)
ATLDP	Army Training and Leader Development Panels. A series of panels begun in 1999 to address training and leader development issues for officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and Army civilians.
AV	Aviation Branch (Army combat arms branch)
AWC	Army War College (senior level officer education course taught at Carlisle Barracks, PA.) For Army officers, requires centralized competitive selection.
BOLC	Basic Officer Leaders Course (experimental initiative to bring all officers to a seven week course after commissioning and before attendance at branch specific basic courses)
CA	Civil Affairs
CAL	Center for Army Leadership (Fort Leavenworth) part of Combined Arms Center and Command and General Staff College
CCC	Captain's Career Course (branch specific school for all officers generally attended after three years of field experience. Pre-requisite for company command)
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Office Course (Army course taught at Fort Leavenworth). For Army officers, requires central competitive selection.
CM	Chemical Corps (Army combat support branch)
CS	Combat support
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSS	Combat Service Support
EN	Engineers (Army combat support branch)
FA	Field Artillery (Army combat arms branch)

FAO	Foreign Area Officer
G1	Army staff directorate responsible for personnel
G3	Army staff directorate responsible for operations and training
GO	General Officer (Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General and General)
ILE	Intermediate Level Education (education for mid-career, junior field grade officers. Typically refers to the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) or its sister service or international counterpart. Can also refer to non-military education for functional area specialists such as Foreign Area Officers)
IN	Infantry (Army combat arms branch)
IOCF	Information Operations Career Field (part of OPMS XXI system)
ISCF	Institutional Support Career Field (part of OPMS XXI system)
JAG	Judge Advocate General Corps
MI	Military Intelligence (Army combat support branch)
MP	Military Police (Army combat support branch)
MSC	Medical Service Corps (Army combat service support branch)
OBC	Officer Basic Course (branch specific school following commissioning and before an officer's first field assignment to an army operational unit)
OCS	Officer Candidate School. School that trains selected enlisted personnel to become commissioned officers.
OER	Officer Evaluation Report. Annually required report on individual officer performance and potential. Key element used by centralized selection and promotion boards to evaluate officers.
OES	Officer Education System
OPCF	Operations Career Field (part of OPMS XXI system). Consists mainly of basic Army branches plus Psyops, Civil Affairs, and Foreign Area Officers
OPMS XXI	Officer Personnel Management System XXI (21 st Century)
OSCF	Operational Support Career Field (part of OPMS XXI system)
PERSCOM	United States Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA
QM	Quartermaster Corps (Army combat service support branch)
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps. Single largest source of yearly officer accessions to the active force.

SC	Signal Corps (Army combat support branch)
SCPME	Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic at West Point. Founded in 1999.
SF	Special Forces (Army combat arms branch)
SOCOM	Special Operations Command (Unified Command)
TC	Transportation Corps (Army combat service support branch)
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft Monroe, VA
UCMJ	Uniformed Code of Military Justice
USMA	United States Military Academy, West Point, NY

Definitions

Military Professional Expertise. The peculiar skill of the military officer is the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization, a profession, whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people.

American Army Professional Expertise. The peculiar skill of the Army officer is the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization, a profession, whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people *incident to sustaining America's dominance in land warfare.* In abbreviated form, this core expertise is referred to as '*Leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force.*'

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